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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Gwen C. Thompson for the Master of Science in
Political Science presented November 10, 1997.

Title: The Reemergence of Kantian Ethics: Have We Adequately Responded to
Hegel's Objections?

The philosophies of Kant and Hegel have experienced a renaissance for the
past thirty years, and a debate continues as to whether Hegel's objections to Kant's
moral philosophy are sound, and/or whether Hegel's ethics are an improvement on
Kant's. This debate takes many forms, and most recently, theorists have been
interested in measuring Hegel's objections against contemporary theories following
in the Kantian tradition. 'Critics,' (theorists defending Hegel's moral point of
view) suggests such reconstructed theories leave themselves open to identical
criticisms Hegel wielded at Kant almost 200 years ago. 'Defenders,' (theorists
supporting Kant's moral philosophy, or a revised version) reply in one of two ways.
They either suggest that Hegel's criticisms of Kant are unwarranted, meaning Hegel
misinterprets Kant's ideas and/or purposes; or, they maintain that Kant's ethics are
vulnerable to Hegel's objections, however some newer version of Kant's ethics is
not because it has been purged of those Kantian elements which Hegel attacks.
Clearly, both views render Hegel's critique of Kant obsolete. So, why are we

witnessing such an aggressive resurgence of Hegelian-styled arguments in the
contemporary literature?
In seeking to answer this question, this thesis reconsiders Hegel's actual
critique of Kant. In this way, the thesis falls into a specific category of political
philosophy. It_is a study in the 'history of ideas.' Rather than considering· the
question of whether contemporary Critics or Defenders have the better argument
concerning the merit of reconstructed Kantian theories, I intend to re-evaluate the
soundness of Hegel's objections to Kantian ethics.
Kant's moral and political thought on the proper ordering of society is
deeply embedded in the pluralist democracies of the western world. As such, those
Kantian ideas/elements should be defendable against Hegelian criticisms.
Following an in-depth consideration of Hegel's critique of Kant, I argue that
whereas Hegel accurately identifies weaknesses in the system of Kant's moral
philosophy, his critique does not successfully achieve its goal. It does not show
that Kant's ethical theory is an inadequate prescription for the rational agent
seeking to act morally. Rather, it serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in
democratic liberal theory.
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Introduction

1. THE PROJECT

This is a work in political philosophy which considers Hegel's critique of
Kant. The philosophies of Kant and Hegel have experienced a renaissance for the
past thirty years, and a debate continues as to whether Hegel's objections to Kant's
moral philosophy are sound, and/or whether Hegel's ethics are an improvement on
Kant's. Indeed, this debate takes many forms, and most recently, theorists have
been interested in measuring Hegel's objections against contemporary theories
following in the Kantian tradition. ' Critics,' (as I shall refer to theorists defending
Hegel' s moral point of view against Kant's) suggest such reconstructed theories
leave themselves open to the identical criticisms which Hegel wielded at Kant
almost 200 years ago. 'Defenders,' (theorists supporting Kant's moral philosophy,
or a revised version) reply in one of two ways. They either suggest that Hegel ' s
criticisms of Kant are unwarranted, meaning Hegel misinterprets Kant's ideas
and/or purposes; or, they maintain that Kant's ethics are vulnerable to Hegel' s
objections, however some newer version of Kant's ethics is not vulnerable to
Hegel's objections because it has been purged of those Kantian elements which

Hegel attacks. Clearly, both views render Hegel's critique of Kant obsolete. So,
why are we witnessing such an aggressive resurgence of Hegelian-styled arguments
in the contemporary literature?
In seeking to answer this question, this thesis reconsiders Hegel's actual
critique of Kant. In this way, the thesis falls into a specific category of political
philosophy. It is a study in 'the history of political ideas.' Rather than considering
the question of whether contemporary Critics or Defenders have the better
argument concerning the merit of reconstructed Kantian theories, I intend to reevaluate the soundness of Hegel's objections to Kantian ethics.
Kant's moral and political thought on the proper ordering of society is
deeply embedded in the pluralist democracies of the western world. As such, those
Kantian ideas/elements should be defendable against Hegelian criticisms. Indeed, I
intend to argue that whereas Hegel accurately identifies weaknesses in the system
of Kant's moral philosophy, his critique does not successfully achieve its goal. It
does not show that Kant's ethical theory is an inadequate prescription for the
rational agent seeking to act morally. I claim here: 1) Kant develops a remarkable,
although imperfect, ethical theory which best serves as the dominant foundation
upon which our system of Right, (or what is a matter of justice) is based, 2) Hegel's
objections are very narrow and 3) Hegel fails to recommend an adequate alternative

theory. As Wood suggests, Hegel's insistence that the 'state' should serve as the
source from which moral duties arise runs counter to the sentiments of democratic
2

society then and now. 1 And, as Riley argues, Hegel simply fails to prove that the
'state' is a fit source for the derivation of a system of right; i.e., that Sittlichkeit is
superior to Moralitiit. 2 Unquestionably, Hegel's ethics are not an improvement on
Kant's, and Hegel's criticisms have been adequately responded to.
In order to clarity this further, I temporarily forgo a discussion of the thesis'
outline and offer here a brief background to 'Hegel's critique of Kant.'

The Background
In several key works dating@ 1802 - 1821, Hegel challenges Kant's ethical
theory on suggesting that Kant's concept of the person and the subject are
abstractions. They are incomplete or one-sided images of the individual human self,
and this is overcome only when individuals are considered in relation to 'ethical
life,' (or Sittlichkeit). Further, Hegel associates Kant's ethics with Moral itat (or
'morality,' as opposed to Sittlichkeit) where obligation is determined not by
something which actually exist, but rather by that which ought to exist (something
which we should all seek to make a reality, whether or not its actual achievement is
possible). Hegel argues that with Moralitat the gap between what ought to be and

1

Allen Wood. Hegel's Ethical Thought. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990) p. 260
Riley suggests, "Hegel is able to exhibit a concrete manifestation of reason in the form of an
ethical community that will provide concrete duties. But it is doubtful, first, whether the state is a
fit object for the "unconditioned self-determination of the will," to use Hegel's own phrase, and
second, whether ethical duties will always be right, unless they are defined as necessarily right. So,
it is hard to see how one is better off with Hegel than with Kant, particularly in view of the fact that
Kant never pits morality against the state ... " Patrick Riley. Will and Political Legitimacy.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) p. 184.
3
2

what is (between Solien and Sein) can never be closed, an~ he is very dissatisfied
'
with this. He views Kant's elevation of autonomy,3 to a first order principle which
is prior to the state, a grave misjudgment. And, his goal is to reverse Kant's
ordering of these.
Indeed, as Wood suggests, it is in Hegel's conception of ethical life that he
asserts the primacy of social life over the individual. He argues that ethical life is
more concrete than abstract right and morality not because it emphasizes the
collective over the individual, but because the ethical image of the individual is a
more concrete one. It addresses every side of the individual self, and situates the
self in a living social order. 4 Wood suggests Hegel's ethical thought has an outward,
social orientation. Its theory of personal morality stresses particular situations and
social relationships, and Hegel's handling of these matters might well point us in
quite a different direction from some standard liberal theories of individual
freedom. 1

As suggested earlier, contemporary theorists disagree regarding the
soundness of Hegel's critique of Kant, and this thesis serves as in inquiry into the
3

Wick notes that autonomy is defined as "freedom under self-imposed law, according to which
each person freely submits to self-discipline under the same rules he would prescribe for others, so
that everyone would act as a law unto himself, or "autonomously," and yet also in cooperative
harmony with everybody else." Immanuel Kant. Ethical Philosophy. The complete text of
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals and Metaphysical Principle of Virtue. Translated by
James W. Ellington, Introduction: Warner A. Wick (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983) p.
xv.
4
Allen Wood. Hegel's Ethical Thought. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990) p. 260.
4

adequacy of Hegel's objections. In this undertaking, Kant and Hegel's moral and
political philosophy are discussed concurrently as moral philosophy is treated as the
normative ground for practical philosophy (positive law, ethics, and justice.)6 Also,
this work is critical rather than speculative, and conceptual rather than empirical.
Instead of trying to formulate a political theory, I will demonstrate that the
Hegelian claim that Kant's ethical theory is vulnerable to Hegel's charge that it is
an 'abstract universalism,' and leads to tautological judgments, does not prove
Kant's thought to be irrational, or inadequate. It can still serve as the normative
ground for theories of justice (or 'right'). To clarify this further, I now describe my
method of analysis.

2. THE METHOD

My analysis begins in chapter two with a synopsis of Kant's moral world
view. It is imperative that Kant's philosophy be properly interpreted here, so as to
adequately measure Hegel's charge. In chapter three, I offer a synopsis of Hegel's
moral world view. Here, I am particularly interested in interpreting Hegel's ethical
thought as it relates to Kant, and as it relates to Hegel's practical philosophy.
Indeed, as we find with Kant, Hegel's ethical thought serves as the basis for his

~

Ibid., p. 260.
As Kymlicka notes, one traditional aim of political philosophy was to find coherent and
comprehensive rules for deciding between conflicting political values. .. And, "political philosophy,
.. is a matter of moral argument, and moral argument is a matter of appeal to our considered
convictions." Will Kymlicka. Contemporary Political Philosophy. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990) pgs. 3 and 5.
5

6

political philosophy, i.e., his ideas on the proper ordering of society. In the fourth
chapter I consider the adequacy of Hegel's critique of Kant. The criticisms which
Hegel leveled against Kant's ethical theory are many, but they are also very closely
related. For this reason, I single out the one which I find the most trenchant. This
allows me to provide the proper depth of analysis required, while keeping the
project to a manageable size, and avoiding redundancy of argument. The charge to
which I refer is often titled the 'emptiness charge,' or 'the impotence of the mere
ought.' Here, Hegel objects to the abstract universalism and the formalism of the
Kantian system. As Hegel sees it, the moral principle of the categorical imperative7
requires that the moral agent abstract from the concrete content of duties and
maxims, and therefore, its application necessarily leads to tautological judgments.8
Hegel adamantly expresses this concern in the Preface of The Phenomenology of

Spirit, stating (rather sarcastically) that Kant ''maintains that such monotony and
abstract universality are the Absolute, and we are assured that dissatisfaction with it
indicates the inability to master the absolute standpoint and to keep hold of it.

7

An ethic is considered formal, or universalist, if it consist of an ' imperative' or ' principle of
justification' which discriminates between valid and invalid norms in terms of their
universalizability. For Kant this is offered in the form of the categorical imperative. As Baynes
shows, in both Kant's moral and political theory, the criterion of legitimacy is related to a concept of
practical reason that is normative in character. He sought to derive the 'supreme moral principle'
(or categorical imperative) from an analysis of the structure of pure practical reason. And, the idea
of the social contract, or notion that laws are legitimate only to the extent that they could receive the
consent of citizens regarded as free and equal moral persons, is also introduced as an idea of pure
practical reason. Kenneth Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1992), p. 3.
8
G.W.F. Hegel. Natural Law. trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1975), p. 76. (Quoted in: Jurgen Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life." Ronald Beiner and W.J.
Booth, Kant and Political Philosophy (London: Yale University Press, 1993), p.321)
6

Time was when the bare possibility of imagining something differently was
sufficient to refute the idea, and this bare possibility, this general thought, also had
the entire positive value of an actual cognition. "9 Hegel finds that the categorical
imperative enjoins separating the universal from the particular. He argues that in
this case, a judgment considered valid in terms of that principle necessarily remains
external to individual cases and insensitive to the particular context of a problem in
need of a solution. 1° Further, " .. the content of the maxim remains what it is, a
specification or singularity, and the universality conferred on it by its reception into
the form is thus a merely analytic unity. And when the unity conferred on it is
expressed in a sentence purely as it is, that sentence is analytic and tautological. " 11
Again, Hegel argues that since the categorical imperative enjoins a strict separation
of' is' from 'ought,' it necessarily fails to answer the question of how moral insight
can be realized in practice. 12 Or, as Riley explains, Hegel rejects Kant's ethic of
'duty for duty's sake' and not for the sake of some real content, and insist as a

9

Hegel argues, "This monochromatic character of the schema and its lifeless determinations, this
absolute identity, and the transition from one to the other, are all equally products of the lifeless
Understanding and external cognition." G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 9.
10
Jurgen Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life." Ronald Beiner and W.J. Booth, Kant and Political
Philosophy (London: Yale University Press, 1993), p.321.
11
Ibid., p.321 .
12
Ibid., p.32 t. Habermas, in discussing this third critique, suggests: "Kant is vulnerable to the
objection that his ethics lacks practical impact because it dichotomizes duty and inclination, reason
and sense experience." However, Haberrnas, concerned that his own theory should be similarly
criticized, argues that the same cannot be said of his theory, for it discards the Kantian theory of the
two realms.
7

result we never know what is in itself good "but only that some action would
contradict a content that is no content."13
It is a quite fair assessment of Hegel's thought to suggest that it is very

complex, as we will see in chapter three. Indeed, whereas it may now be clear that
Hegel's most trenchant charge results from his insistence that ethics be based on
real life as opposed to purely abstracted ideals, its content must reflect upon that
which is the 'Absolute' - meaning, nature itself, and ethics must never separate
nature from morality, the universal from the particular, or the right from the good,
this is admittedly a rather simplistic rendering of Hegel analysis. In fact, the
literature contains many different versions of Hegel's charges, each controversial. 14
Therefore, it should be noted that the approach I take to understanding Hegel
(referred to by Beiser as the 'modem-positivistic approach') basically discards
much of his metaphysics, and is concerned mostly with his philosophical (moral
and political) significance. 15 Further, this final stage of the thesis (chapter four)
attempts to bring together Kant's and Hegel's arguments on the necessary
foundations of morality, eluminating critical elements of their thought which
remains important to contemporary political theory, and to show that Hegel simply
looses the battle to prove Kant's ethics are ' contentless.' Whereas we can certainly
13

Patrick Riley. Will and Political Legitimacy. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1982) pg.
184.
14
As Beiser notes, few thinkers in the history of philosophy are more controversial than Hegel.
Not only contemporary philosophers have difficulty coming to terms with Hegel's (writings]: Hegel
scholars also remain deeply divided over its status and worth. Frederick Beiser. The Cambridge
Companion to Hegel. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 2.
8

appreciate Hegel's critique of the abstract universalism in Kant's thought (and these
features are difficult to justify) the best defense of the Kantian position has always
been, and remains to be, a review of that which constitutes its 'opposite'- or, a more
'Hegelian' prescription.

Ronald Beiner points out that the fate of grand philosophical edifices is that
the elaborate articulations binding their various parts are eventually dissolved and
those now-detached elements appropriated according to the interests of the times. 1 ~
Considering Beiner's comments, both Kant's and Hegel's philosophy seem to have
fared very well. (Apparently, only fifty years ago the influence of Kant's moral and
political philosophy extended scarcely further than a few German professors and
their disciples.) 1' Today, we are witnessing an enormous tribute to their thought.
The current debate, recognizing our dominant political theory as 'Kantian
liberalism,' is concerned with its deontology (the 'prioritization of 'right,' or what is
a matter of justice, over the good.) However, as I claim here, a reconsideration of
Hegel's critique of Kant does not resolve this concern.

IS
16

Ibid., p. 3.

Ronald Seiner and W.J. Booth, Kant and Political Philosophy (London: Yale University Press,
1993), p. l.
17
W.A. Galston, "What Is Living and What is Dead in Kant's Practical Philosophy?" Ibid., Seiner
and Booth, p. 207.
9

2
Kant's Moral Point of View
"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing
admiration and awe, the more often and more steadily we reflect
on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within
me." KANT

In examining history, Kant found that the moral philosophers preceding him
had failed to account for our most basic moral concepts. What was needed was to
make explicit what is present in "common sense" moral knowledge. Indeed, Kant
associated the lack of success of moral philosophers preceding him to their failure
to recognize these three tasks:
1) to clarify "the supreme principle of morality," the principle on which a
rational agent is thought to act insofar as his action is morally good, 18
2) to justify this principle, that is to show that it actually holds for or is
binding upon imperfectly rational agents such as human beings; and
3)

to~

this principle in a "metaphysics of morals," so as to obtain "the

whole system" of human duties. 19

18
Kant characterizes persons as being both "reasonable" and "rational" in a full-bodied conception ,
"Vernunftig." As Rawls explains, this German term can have the broad sense of "reasonable" as
well as the narrower sense of"rational," as we use these terms. Further, "It is useful, then, to use
"reasonable" and "rational" as handy terms to mark the distinction that Kant makes between two
forms of practical reason, pure and empirical." John Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy,"
Kant and Political Philosophy (London: Yale University Press, 1993) p. 296.
Also, as Hoffe notes, the important point here is that Kant finds that only rational beings
have the capacity of acting according to conceptions oflaws, and thus morally. Outfried Hoffe.
Immanuel Kant. (New York: State University Press, 1992) p. 170.
19
Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals, translated with an introduction by Mary Gregor.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. l .
10

In taking up these tasks himself, Kant is faced with tremendous challenges,
evidence of which is witnessed in his many works. 20 Whether or not he succeeds at
these continues to be debated. However, as many of his basic conclusions on ethics
presently serve as normative grounds for contemporary liberal democratic political
thought (i.e., the self is today viewed predominately as an 'autonomous' -selflegislating- individual, worthy of equal concern and respect), I am inclined to view
this as the type of success Kant sought.

I. CLARIFICATION OF THE SUPREME PRINCIPAL OF MORALITY

In the GMM, Kant explores the possibility of morality, and concludes that
pure practical reason can yield moral knowledge. Since he assumes human beings
recognize duties prescribed by moral laws, he investigates, first, the manner of
"willing" that distinguishes a morally good action from a merely lawful one and,
second, what is presupposed by the principle prescribing this sort of volition. 21
Therefore, as Beck shows,
20

There is no simple, short or authoritative statement of Kant's ethical theory as a whole. (Kant,
like Hegel, issues several encyclopedic works in order to explicate his moral point of view.) The
two works which are commonly used for that purpose, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals, 1785 (hereafter GMM), and the Critique ofPractical Reason, 1788 (hereafter CPrR), are
not well suited for it as they fonn an incomplete picture. Both of these works are important,
however, as it is here that Kant introduces his key analytical concepts, pure practical reason and the
categorical imperative. However, his substantive moral doctrine (or what many philosophers today
refer to as "nonnative ethics") was expounded primarily in the Metaphysics ofMorals, 1797
(hereafter MM). It is often suggested that this portion of Kant's moral philosophy is not generally
known, or is known in sketchy and distorted fonns, due, as far as the English speaking world is
concerned, to the lack of available translations of the MM, and/or the fact that many theorists
mistake the GMMto be Kant's definitive work in moral philosophy. The GMM, the first work of his
Critical philosophy, is offered as a preliminary to the eventual MM. Yet, it is much more than an
introduction to Kant's ideas on morality, or a precursor to the MM. It is a major work in moral
philosophy in its own right, and contains in-depth reviews of many of the critical concepts. As
such, I rely on this work a great deal here.
21
Thinking in tenns of separate faculties of the mind, Kant attributes the initiation of action to the
will, responding to desires. J.B. Schneewind, "Autonomy, obligation and virtue: An overview of
1I

"The [GMM] is intended for the general reader who
possesses "common rational knowledge of morality"
but lacks a philosophical theory of it. The ordinary
man knows very well in most cases what he ought to
do, but may not be able to defend his views against
criticism. Hence Kant begins with the commonly
held Christian-humanistic ideals of Western
civilization, and examines them to determine their
presuppositions so that he can construct a system of
moral precepts which can be intellectually defended."
22

Again, Kant held that the proper way to proceed in moral philosophy is to
start with what we know about morality and see what principles underlie it. Thus,
the GMMbegins with an examination of what Kant believes to be common sense
opinion.
Kant writes,
"Nothing in the world - indeed nothing even beyond
the world- can possibly be conceived which could be
called good without qualification except a good will.
Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of
the mind, however they may be named, or courage,
resoluteness, and perseverance as qualities of
temperment, are doubtless in many respects good and
desirable. But they can become extremely bad and
harmful if the will, which is to make use of these gifts
of nature and which in its special constitution is
called character, is not good." (GMM, 9)
From this, Kant extracts the motive that is central to morality as well as the
basic principle of decision making. His claim is that we all recognize a kind of
goodness different from the goodness of wealth, power, talent, and intellect; even
Kant's moral philosophy." The Cambridge Companion to Kant. (NewYork: Cambridge University
Press, 1992) p. 315.
22
Immanuel Kant. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. trans. Lewis W. Beck. (New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), p.vii.
12

different from goodness of kindly or generous dispositions. 23 Under certain
conditions any of these might turn out not to be good. This special kind of
goodness is shown most clearly, Kant thinks, when someone does what she
believes is right or obligatory for its own sake. The special sort of merit we
attribute to this person is the goodness central to morality, and it is best thought of
as the goodness of a good will. 24
Thus, we find that for Kant, the moral motive is equivalent to doing that
which is right, and this is the basic principle of moral decision making.
Additionally, it is the person in possession of a good will who acts in this manner.
Kant finds that our reason is not competent to guide the will safely with regard to
its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs. "To this end an innate instinct
would have led with far more certainty." Thus, reason is given to us as a practical
faculty. It is only meant to have an influence on the will, and its proper function
must be to produce a will good in itself and not good merely as means. As he puts
it,
"This will must indeed not be the sole and complete
good but the highest good and the condition of all
others, even of the desire for happiness. In this case
it is entirely compatible with the wisdom of nature
that the cultivation of reason, which is required for
23

Kant refers to these as "gifts of nature" and states, "Power, riches, honor, even health, general
well-being, and the contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, makes for pride and
even arrogance ifthere is not a good will to correct their influence on the mind and on its principles
of action so as to make it universally conformable to its end. It need hardly be mentioned that the
sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure and good will, yet enjoying uninterrupted
prosperity, can never give pleasure to a rational impartial observer. Thus the good will seems to
constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy." (GMM, 9)
24
Kant suggests that the good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or
because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end. Rather, it is good only because of its
willing, i.e., it is good of itself. Also, he states," .. regarded for itself, it is to be esteemed
incomparably higher than anything which could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination or
even of the sum total of all inclinations." (GMM, 10)
13

the former unconditional purpose, at least if this life
restricts in many ways- indeed can reduce to less than
nothing - the achievement of the latter conditional
purpose, happiness. For one perceives that nature
here does not proceed unsuitably to its purpose,
because reason, which recognizes its highest practical
vocation in the establishment of a good will, is
capable only of a contentment of its own kind, i.e.,
one that springs from the attainment of a purpose
which is determined by reason, even though this
injures the ends of inclination." (GMM,12)

In defining the idea of good will, and its relation to reason, Kant's theory of
how morality is possible begins to take form. He finds that the self is not only in
possession of reason and a will, but also the product of the two; good will, "dwells
already in the natural sound understanding and does not need so much to be taught
as only to be brought to light. " 25 And, again, Kant finds that "in the estimation of
the total worth of our actions it always take first place and is the condition of
everything else."26 In order to clarify this further, Kant introduces the concept
duty.

Kant shows that to be kind where one can is duty, and there are many
persons so sympathetically constituted that without any motive of vanity or
selfishness they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy, and rejoice in the
contentment of others which they have made possible. (GMM, 14) Yet, however
dutiful and amiable this may be, it has no true moral worth. Instead, it is on a level
with actions arising from other inclinations, such as the inclination to honor. He
25
26

Ibid., p. 12
Ibid., p. 13.
14

offers an example of action resulting from duty, and thereby having moral worth as
one in which a man - laden with horrible sorrow - tears himself, unsolicited by
inclination, out of this dead insensibility to help someone else. Since there was no
selfish motivation involved, and the man acted purely from what he believed was
his duty, this beneficent act was a moral act. 27
To tie this together with our previous concepts (reason and good will), we
might say that where our reason shed light on our good will, we will recognize and
respond to duty, absent inclination. This conclusion receives unrelenting criticism,
which takes several forms. However, most reflect the concern that Kant's
conclusion contradicts itself in practice, i.e., in considering actual society we find
that people often act from inclination alone, rather than from duty alone, so why
should anyone believe that all men possess such a good will? Additionally, Kant's
prioritization of duty over our natural inclinations proves problematic as it is found
to be merely 'constructivist' and nothing more, i.e., where Hegel criticizes Kant's
moral thought as formalist and empty. (I review this criticism further in the
following chapter.)

The Propositions
Kant then derives these propositions of morality. The first proposition (or
principle) is: "To have moral worth an action must be done from duty." The second
proposition is: "An action performed from duty does not have its moral worth in the

27

Kant refers to this kind of action as "beneficence from duty," and suggests," .. beneficence from
duty, when no inclination impels it and even when it is opposed by a natural and unconquerable
aversion, is practical love, not pathological love; ii resides in the will and not in the propensities of
feeling. in principles of action and not in tender sympathy; and it alone can be commanded." Ibid.,
p.16.
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purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the maxim28 by which it is
determined." The moral value of the maxim, therefore, does not depend on the
realization of the object of the action but rather on the principle of volition from
which the action is done, without regard to the objects of the faculty of desire. The
moral worth of the act, therefore, lies in the principle of the will.
"For the will stands, as it were, at the crossroads
halfway between its a priori principle which is
formal, and its a posteriori incentive which is
material. Since it must be determined by something,
if it is done from duty it must be determined by the
formal principle of volition as such since every
material principle has been withdrawn from it."
(GMM, 16)
The third proposition is: "Duty is the necessity of an action executed from
respect for the [moral] law."29 Here, Kant is suggesting that one cannot respect any
inclination whatsoever. Respect is only given in the case where the activity is a
result of the will. One can approve of it, or even love it (i.e., see it as favorable to
one's own advantage), he suggests. However, that which is connected with one's
will merely as ground and not as consequence, i.e. law itself, can be an object of
respect. 30
The concept of "law," specifically the idea ofrespect for this practical law,
has now entered the picture. From here Kant moves to suggest that acting out of
respect for law, acting from this pre-eminent good (the moral law), can be present

28

Kant states: "A maxim is defined as "the subjective principle of volition." Ibid., p.17.
Ibid., p.16.
3
° Kant is particularly interested in that which commands, as, again, his goal is to clarify "the
supreme principle which commands morality."
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only in rational beings. 31 Also, this pre-eminent good, which we call moral, is
already present in the person who acts according to this conception, and we need
not look for it first in the result (it exists a priori - in the will.) We can now
understand what Kant means by "acting in accordance with the moral law."
One may wonder what remains of our inclinations in regards to this law?
The answer is - nothing remains at all. Kant states defiantly that he has robbed the
will of all impulses which could come to it from obedience to any law, and that
nothing remains to serve as a principle of the will except universal conformity to
the law. "That is, I should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my
maxim should be a universal law." (GMM, 18) Also, "the common reason of
mankind in its practical judgments is in perfect agreement with this and had this
principle constantly in view."32 (GMM, 18)
Kant concludes this section of the GMM suggesting that "to duty every
other motive must give place." Duty is the condition of a will good in itself, whose
worth transcends everything. "Thus, within the moral knowledge of common
human reason we have attained its principle."n Kant allows that common human

31

As Rawls notes, we must keep in mind that Kant is concerned solely with the reasoning of fully
reasonable and rational and sincere agents. John Rawls, "Themes in Kant 's Moral Philosophy,"
Kant and Political Philosophy (London: Yale University Press, 1993) p. 292.
32
This suggestion, again, begs criticism - and receives a great deal of it. As we saw earlier, such
criticisms generally suggests that were mankind to have this principle constantly in view, it is
unlikely that we would witness soo much 'non-moral' behavior. However, I am inclined to agree
with Kant, that the rational person does have this principle constantly in view, although we do not
understand it in such an abstract and universalistic fonn. Further, for the purpose of practical moral
philosophy, I find it understandable that Kant's arguments may be viewed as too speculative to
serve as the basis for nonnative ethics (politics). And, it is unfortunate that Kant cannot get beyond
this speculative reasoning.
33
GMM, p. 20.
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reason does not think of it abstractly in such a universal form, but it always has it in
view and uses it as the standard of its judgments. 34
Another concern which naturally arises at this point (one which Kant
anticipates) is if everyone has the ability, and is morally required, to act from pure
practical reason, what purpose does the moral philosopher serve? Why is a
metaphysics of morals needed? Kant's response is that it would be wise to have
philosophy ascertain the moral from common rational judgment in order to make
the system of morals more complete and comprehensible and its rules more
convenient for use (especially in disputation) than to steer the common
understanding from its happy simplicity in practical matters. 35 Further, he shows
34

Regarding our judgments, I should point out that Kant prioritizes practical reason over
theoretical reason. He finds that knowledge contains both fonns ofreason. However, "Here, we
cannot but admire the great advantages which the practical faculty ofjudgment has over the
theoretical in ordinary human understanding. In the theoretical, if ordinary reason ventures to go
beyond the laws of experience and perceptions of the senses, it falls into sheer inconceivabilities
and self-contradictions, or at least into a chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. In the
practical, on the other hand, the power of judgment first shows itself to advantage when common
understanding excludes all sensuous incentives from practical laws. It then becomes even subtle,
quibbling with its own conscience or with other claims to what should be called right, or wishing to
determine correctly for its own instruction the worth of certain actions. But the most remarkable
thing about ordinary reason in its practical concern is that it may have as much hope as any
philosopher of hitting the mark. In fact, it is almost more certain to do so than the philosopher,
because he has no principle which the common understanding lacks, while his judgment is easily
confused by a mass of irrelevant considerations, so that it easily turns aside from the correct way."
(GMM, 20 - 21).
35
"Man feels himself a powerful counterpoise against all commands of duty which reason presents
to him as so deserving ofrespect; this counterpoise is his needs and inclinations, the complete
satisfaction of which he sums up under the name happiness. Now reason issues inexorable
commands without promising anything to the inclinations. It disregards, as it were, and holds in
contempt those claims which are so impetuous and yet so plausible, and which will not allow
themselves to be abolished by a command. From this a natural dialectic arises, i.e., a propensity to
argue against the stem laws of duty and their validity, or at least to place their purity and strictness
in doubt and, where possible, to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations. This
is equivalent to corrupting them in their very foundations and destroying their dignity - a thing
which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good. In this way common human
reason is impelled to go outside its sphere and to take a step into the field of practical philosophy. It
is impelled on practical grounds in order to obtain infonnation and clear instruction respecting the
source of its principle and the correct determination of this principle in its opposition to the maxims
which are based on need and inclination. (GMM, 22. My emphasis)
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(our) reason seeks this information in order to escape from the perplexity of
opposing claims and to avoid the danger of losing all genuine moral principles
through the equivocation of that in which it is easily involved. For example, he
suggests,

"Innocence is indeed a glorious thing, but on the
other hand, it is very sad that it cannot maintain itself,
being easily led astray. For this reason, even wisdom
- which consists more in acting than in knowledge needs science, not to learn from it but to secure
admission and permanence to its precepts ....Thus,
when practical reason cultivates itself, a dialectic
surreptitiously ensues which forces it to seek aid in
philosophy, just as the same thing happens in the
theoretical use of reason. In this case, as in the
theoretical, it will find rest only in a thorough critical
examination of our reason."(GMM, 22)

Transition From Common Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysics o{Mora/s
As we have seen, Kant finds that everything in nature works according to
laws, and only a rational being has the capacity of acting according to a conception
of laws, i.e. according to principles. Also, we have seen that this capacity is called
"will." Kant now emphasizes that since reason is required for the derivation of
actions from laws, will (Wille) is nothing else than practical reason. Also, the
conception of an objective principle, so far as it constrains the will, is a command
(ofreason), the formula of which is called an imperative. 36
Jb
Kant shows that "All imperatives are expressed by an "ought" and thereby indicate the relation
of an objective law of reason to a will which is not in its subjective constitution necessarily
detennined by this law. This relation is that of constraint. Imperatives say that it would be good to
do or to refrain from doing something, but they say it to a will which does not always do something
simply because it is presented as a good thing to do. Practical good is what determines the will by
means of the conception of reason and hence not by subjective causes but, rather, objectively, i.e. on
grounds which are valid for every rational being as such . .. A perfectly good will, .. would be
19

The Categorical Imperative (Cl)
As Hoffe explains, imperatives respond to man's basic practical question,
"What ought I to do?" 31 Kant distinguishes between a hypothetical and a
categorical imperative, suggesting all imperatives command either hypothetically
or categorically. The hypothetical imperative presents the practical necessity of a
possible action as a means to achieving something else which one desires. By
contrast, categorical (or moral) imperatives are those which present an action as
absolutely necessary, without regard to any other end. The hypothetical imperative,
therefore, says only that the action is good to some purpose, possible or actual.
However, the categorical imperative declares that the action is objectively
necessary, without making any reference to a purpose. Kant also finds that
imperatives which refer to the choice of "means to ones own happiness" are still
hypothetical (although he does associate significant importance to happiness 38).
Therefore, the one imperative which directly commands a certain conduct without
making its condition some purpose to be reached by it, is the categorical
imperative. It concerns not the material of the action and its intended result but

equally subject to objective laws (of the good), but it could not be conceived as constrained by them
to act in accord with them, because, according to its own subjective constitution, it can be
detennined to act only through the conception of the good. Thus no imperatives hold for the divine
will or, more generally, for a holy will. The "ought" is out of place here. (GMM, 30-31. My
emphasis).
37
Outfried Hoffe. Immanuel Kant (New York: State University Press, 1994) p. 146.
38
As Schneewind shows, Kant is often thought to hold that happiness is not valuable, and even to
have ignored it wholly in his ethics. This is a serious mistake. It is true that for Kant moral worth is
the supreme good, but by itself it is not the perfect or complete good. To be virtuous, for Kant, is to
be worthy of happiness. And the perfect good requires that happiness be distributed in accordance
with virtue. ..Happiness, or the sum of satisfaction of desires, is a conditional good. It is good only
if it results from the satisfaction of morally permissible desires. J. B. Schneewind, "Autonomy,
obligation and virtue: An overview ofKant's moral philosophy." The Cambridge Companion to
Kant. (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 333.
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(similar to Kant's description of the concept duty) the form and the principle from
which it results. Kant says of the Cl, "What is essentially good in it consists in the
intention, the result being what it may. This imperative may be called the
imperative of morality." (GMM, 33)
Importantly, Kant also shows that the Cl alone can be taken as practical law,
while all the others may be called principles of the will, but not laws. 39 The
categorical imperative is thus: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can
at the same time will that it should become universal law." (GMM, 39) And, this
then is the principle contained in our "common rational knowledge of morals" or,
"the moral law. " 40
Finally, we then find that categorical obligations, which rely on no
presuppositions, thus obligating without qualification; are therefore valid
universally: necessarily and without exception. Also, strict universality thus
39

As Wick notes Kant's conclusion is that there is one supreme principle for the whole field of
morals, including his philosophy of law as well as the ethical demands of personal integrity and
social intercourse, and this is the famous "categorical imperative." Further, "Kant's conclusion is
that morality demands that we act on the sort of policies which, if adopted by everyone, would
generate a community of free and equal members, each of whom would in the process of realizing
his own purposes also further the aims of his fellows. As an ideal such a community is not fully
realizable, but it both defines the objective of the moral law, and is at the same time applicable to
everyday situations in that we ought never act in a way that would be incompatible with it. Its basis
is the idea ofautonomy, or freedom under self-imposed law, according to which each person freely
submits to self-discipline under the same rules he would prescribe for others, so that everyone
would act as a law unto himself, or "autonomously," and yet also in cooperative harmony with
everyone else." Immanuel Kant. Ethical Philosophy. The complete text of Grounding for the
Metaphysics of Morals and Metaphysical Principle of Virtue. Translated by James W. Ellington,
Introduction: Warner A. Wick (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983) p. xv. (My emphasis.)
40
Importantly, Kant shows that the Cl can be fonnulated in several ways, yet, all are equivalent.
He insists that the first fonnulation, (stated) is basic, and, although the others bring out various
aspects of the moral law, they cannot tell us more than the first formula does. It concentrates on the
agent's point of view. The second fonnulation draws our attention to those affected by our action:
"Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." And, the third
fonnulation instructs us to look at the agent and recipient of action together in a community as we
legislate through our maxims: "All maxims as proceeding from our own law-making ought to
harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature." (GMM, 39)
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constitutes the hallmark and the criterion for morality. 41 The universalization
present in every maxim is subjective (relative) universality and not objective
(absolute or strict) universality, which holds for any rational being whatsoever. 42
The CJ tests whether or not the subjective perspective given by a maxim can also be
conceived and willed as an objective perspective for a community of persons. And
from the broad variety of subjective principles (maXims), the moral ones are
separated from the non-moral ones, and the agent is enjoined to follow the moral
maxims. 43

The Realm o[Ends
As we have seen previously, the will is thought of as a faculty of
determining itself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws, and
such a faculty can be found only in rational beings. Kant expands on this idea
showing that which serves the will as the absolute ground of its self-determination
is an end, and, if it is given by reason alone, it must hold alike for all rational
beings. Also, that which contains the ground of the possibility of the action, whose
result is an end, is called the means. (GMM, 45)
Kant's discussion of ends and means is a very important part of his ethics,
as here Kant further clarifies his idea of moral motive. He finds that the subjective
ground of desire is the incentive, while the objective ground of volition is the
motive. Thus arises the distinction between subjective ends, which rest on
incentives, and objective ends, which depend on motives valid for every rational
being. Further, he shows that practical principles are formal when they disregard
41

42
43

Outfried Hoffe. Immanuel Kant (New York: State University Press, 1994) p. 148.
Ibid., p. 151 .
Ibid., p. 151.
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all subjective ends, and they are material when they have subjective ends; and thus
certain incentives, as their basis. The ends which a rational being arbitrarily
proposes for himself as consequences of his action are material ends and are
without exception only relative, because their relation to a particularly constituted
faculty of desire in the subject gives them worth. And this worth cannot, therefore,
afford any universal principles for every volition. Meaning, they cannot give rise to
any practical laws. All their relative ends are grounds for hypothetical imperatives
only.
Kant's purpose in clarifying the distinction between ends and means is also
to show that if there were something which had absolute worth, something which
existed as an end itself, it could be a ground of definite laws. In it and only in it
could lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, a practical law. Further,
since every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to
be arbitrarily used by this or that will, "In his actions, whether they be directed to
himself or to other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as
an end." (GMM, 46) Such a being is therefore an object of respect and restricts all
arbitrary choice.
Further, regarding the idea of respect, Kant shows such beings are not
merely subjective ends whose existence as a result of our action has a worth for us,
but are objective ends, i.e., beings whose existence in itself is an end. And, such an
end is one for which no other end can be substituted, to which these beings should
serve merely as means. "For, without them, nothing of absolute worth could be
found, and all worth is conditional and thus contingent, no supreme practical

principle for reason could be found." (GMM, 47)
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Kant is now in position to show that if there is to be a supreme practical
principle, a CJ for the human will, it must be one that forms an objective principle
of the will from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone
because it is an end in itself. He states, "This objective can serve as a universal
practical law, therefore, and the ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as
an end in itself." (GMM, 47) And, its practical imperative (or a second formulation
of the CJ) is therefore: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." (GMM, 47)
Kant suggests if we now look back upon all previous attempts which have
been undertaken to discover the principle of morality, it is not to be wondered at
that they all had to fail.

"Man was seen to be bound to laws by his duty, but it
was not seen that he is subject only to his own, yet
universal legislation, and that he is only bound to act
in accordance with his own will, which is, however,
designed by nature to be a will giving universal laws.
For if one thought of him as subject only to a law
(whatever it may be), this necessarily implied some
interest as a stimulus or compulsion to obedience
because the law did not arise from his will. Rather,
his will was constrained by something else according
to a law to act in a certain way. By this strictly
necessary consequence, however, all the labor of
finding a supreme ground for duty was irrevocably
lost, and one never arrived at duty but only at the
necessity of action from a certain interest. This might
be his own interest or that of another, but in either
case the imperative always had to be conditional and

could not at all serve as a moral command. This
principle I will call the principle of autonomy of the
24

will in contrast to all other principles which I
accordingly count under heteronomy."(GMM, 51)44
Autonomy
In Kant's terminology, we are autonomous, and this involves two
components. The first is that no authority external to ourselves is needed to
constitute or inform us of the demands of morality. We can each know without
being told what we ought to do because moral requirements are requirements we
impose on ourselves.4 s The second is that in self-government we can effectively
control ourselves.46 Schneewind shows that for Kant, the obligation we impose
upon ourselves override all other calls for action, and frequently runs counter to our
desires. Yet we nonetheless always have sufficient motive to act as we ought. No
44

Schneewind points out that Kant's attribution of autonomy to every normal adult was a radical
break with prevailing views of the moral capacity of ordinary people. "The natural law theorists
whose work was influential through the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth centuries did not on
the whole think that most people could know without being told, everything that morality requires
of them. The lawyers were willing to admit that God had given everyone the ability to know the
most basic principle of morality. But they held that the many are unable to see all the moral
requirements implicit in the principles and often can not grasp by themselves what is required in
particular cases. Further, the natural lawyers viewed God as the legislator of moral law. They
viewed humans as God's subjects, in need of tremendous discipline. Kant rejected this low estimate
of human moral capacity, however. He offered, instead, a theory of moral obligation based on the
Roussean notion offreedom . In reading Rousseau, Kant became convinced that everyone must have
the capacity to be a self-governing moral agent, and that it is this characteristic that gives each
person a special kind of value or dignity." Schneewind also shows that , "Culture in its present
corrupt state conceals this capacity of ours, Rousseau thought, and society must be changed to let is
show and be effective. In the Social Contract he called for the construction of a community in
which everyone agrees to be governed by the dictates of the "general will," a will representing each
individual's truest and deepest aims and directed always at the good of the whole. The general will
would have to be able to override the passing desires each of us feels for private goods. But,
Rousseau said, "the impulse of appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law one has
prescribed for oneself is freedom." Schneewind notes that previous thinkers had frequently used the
metaphor of slavery to describe the condition in which we are controlled by our passions, but for
them the alternative was to follow laws that God or nature prescribe. Rousseau held that we make
our own law and in doing so create the foundation for a free and just social order. This thought
became central to Kant's understanding of morality. J.B. Schneewind. "Autonomy, obligation, and

virtue: An overview ofKant's moral philosophy." The Cambridge Companion to Kant. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 314.
4
S Ibid., p. 309.
46
Ibid., p. 309.
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external source of motivation is needed for our self-legislation to be effective in
controlling our behavior.47 He also shows that Kant thinks autonomy has basic
social and political implications. "Although no one can lose the authority that is a
part of the nature of rational agents, social arrangements and the actions of others
can encourage lapses into governance by our desires, or heteronomy." 48 Kant found
it difficult to explain just how this could happen; but he always held that the moral
need for our autonomy to express itself was incompatible with certain kinds of
social regulation. 49 Further, as Kant sees it, there is no place for others to tell us
what morality requires; nor has anyone the authority to do so - not our neighbors,
magistrates or their laws, not even those who speak in the name of God. Because
we are autonomous, each of us must be allowed a social space within which we
may freely determine our own action. Also, this freedom cannot be limited to
members of some privileged class. The structure of society must reflect and
express the common and equal moral capacity of its members. 50
Having now clarified those basic concepts which structure his ethical
theory, Kant can now fully define "morality," and states:
"Morality is thus the relation of actions to the
autonomy of the will, i.e., to possible universal
lawgiving by maxims of the will. The action which
can be compatible with autonomy of the will is
permitted; that which does not agree with it is
prohibited. The will whose maxims necessarily are
47

Ibid., p. 310.
Ibid., p. 310.
49
Ibid., p. 310.
50
Schneewind points out that in the works What is Enlightenment? (1784) and Perpetual Peace
(1795) (two of Kant's political works), Kant discusses the social and political implications of
autonomy. In brief, (as a substantive review of these works goes far beyond the limits of this essay)
Kant's message is that each person should refuse to remain under the tutelage of others, and, for all
states to be organized as republics wherein every citizen can express his moral freedom publicly in
political action. Ibid., p. 311.
48
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in harmony with the laws of autonomy is a holy will
or an absolutely good will. The dependence of a will
not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy
(moral constraint) is obligation. Hence obligation
cannot be applied to a holy will. The objective
necessity of an action from obligation is called duty."
(GMM, 58)
Kant acknowledges that the next step is for him to justify the idea that
autonomy of the will is unavoidably connected with this "synthetic practical a

priori proposition," the CJ, or rather that it is its foundation. He refers to all
discussion covered prior to this justification as merely analytical and suggests proof
that morality is not a mere phantom of the mind, requires that a synthetic use of
pure practical reason is possible. 51

2. JUSTIFICATION OF THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY

Schneewind explains the problem, as Kant sees it, is to discover something
through which we can join the subject of the moral law - the "perfectly rational
agent" - and its predicate - "acts only through universalizable maxims."52 Kant sees
a possible solution in the idea of freedom of the will. In the third and final section
of the GMM (and throughout the CPrR) Kant suggests the concept of freedom is

51
Hoffe points out, the idea of goodness, the categorical imperative, and the principle of autonomy
constitute necessary elements of a philosophical ethics, but they do not suffice to complete it.
Unless Kant can demonstrate the existence of morality, as the object of investigation shared by all
three elements, he does not achieve his goal of overcoming 'ethical skepticism.' "The latter view
can only be refuted if morality proves to be an actual "fact" and does not ultimately rely upon
personal, cultural, historical, or genetic illusions." Outfried Hoffe. Immanuel Kant (New York:
State University Press, 1994) p. 161.
52
J. B. Schneewind. "Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral philosophy."
The Cambridge Companion to Kant. (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 328.
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the key to the explanation of the autonomy of the will and its relation to the moral
law. He finds that no theoretical proof (or disproof) of free will can be given. Yet,
in the GMMKant thinks he can give at least indirect support to the claim that we
are free.

53

He says that when rational beings act, we must take ourselves to be free,

and by this he means that whenever we deliberate or choose we are presupposing
freedom, even if we are unaware of the presupposition or consciously doubtful of
it. 54 More broadly, whenever we take ourselves to be thinking rationally (even
about purely theoretical matters) we must take ourselves to be free, because we
cannot knowingly accept judgments determined by external sources as judgments
we ourselves have made. 55 Now anything that would follow about us if we were
really free still follows for practical purposes if we have to think of ourselves as
free.
Kant continues to develop his idea of freedom in the CPrR as he is not yet
satisfied with this justification. This leads him to his notion of "the fact of

reason." 56 Rawls, who offers a rather clear interpretation of Kant's quite obscure
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Ibid., p. 328.
Ibid., p. 329.
55
Ibid., p. 329.
56
As Rawls shows, it is pure practical reason which needs to be authenticated. He states, " .. we
long to derive its law, as Kant did for may years, from some firm foundation, either in theoretical
reason or in experience, or in the necessary conditions of a unified public order of conduct, or,
failing all of these, from the idea of freedom itself, as Kant still hopes to do in the Grundlegung.
But none of these authentication's are available within Kant's critical philosophy. In the second
Critique, Kant recognizes this and accepts the view that pure practical reason, with the moral law as
its first principle, is authenticated by the fact of reason ... only from a practical point of view." He
suggest additionally," .. by the time of the second Critique Kant has developed, I think, not only a
constructivist conception of practical reason but a coherentist account of its authentication. This is
the significance of his doctrine of the fact ofreason and of his abandoning his hitherto vain search
28
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notion "the fact of reason," suggests Kant shows that the moral law can be given no
deduction, that is, no justification of its objective and universal validity, but rests on
the fact of reason. Additionally, Rawls points out that this fact is the fact that in our
common moral consciousness we recognize and acknowledge the moral law as
supremely authoritative and immediately controlling for us. Also, Kant shows here
the moral law needs no justifying grounds; to the contrary, that law proves not only
the possibility but also the actuality of freedom in those who recognize and
acknowledge that law as supremely authoritative. 57

for a so-called deduction of the moral law ... this doctrine may look like a step backward into
intuitionism, or else into dogmatism ... Here I think Kant may be ahead of his critics. A
constructivist and coherentist doctrine of practical reason is not without strengths as a possible
view; and as such it is part of the legacy Kant left to the tradition of moral philosophy." John
Rawls. "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy." Kant and Political Philosophy (London: Yale
University Press, 1993) p. 308. (My emphasis)
Indeed, Kant shows," (while) the objective reality of the moral law can be proved through
... no exertion of the theoretical reason, whether speculative or empirically supported ...
Nevertheless, it is finnly established of itself... Instead of this vainly sough deduction of the moral
principle, however, something entirely different and unexpected appears: the moral principle itself
serves as a principle of the deduction of an unscrutable faculty which no experience can prove but
which speculative reason had to assume as at least possible (in order not to contradict itself..)
"This is the faculty of freedom, which the moral law, itself needing no justifying grounds, shows to
be not only possible but actual in beings that acknowledge the law as binding upon them" (CP 5:47)
(See also Rawls. "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy" p. 312.)
57
The Antinomy of Freedom and Necessity - As Paton suggests, if morality is to be derived from
freedom, and if, morality must be valid for all rational beings as such, it looks as if we have got to
prove that the will of a rational being as such is necessarily free. This can never be proved by any
experience of merely human action, nor indeed can it be proved at all from the point of view of
philosophical theory. For purposes of action, however, it would be enough if we could show that a
rational being can act only under the presupposition of freedom; for if this were so, the moral laws
bound up with freedom would be valid for him just as much as ifhe were known to be free. Also,
reason as such must necessarily function under the presupposition that it is free both negatively and
positively: it must presuppose that it is not determined by outside influences and that it is the source
of its won principles. If a rational subject supposed his judgments to be determined, not by rational
principles, but by external impulsions, he could not regard these judgements as his own. This must
be equally true of practical reason: a rational agent must regard himself as capable of acting on his
own rational principles and only so can he regard his will as his own. That is to say, from a
practical point of view every rational agent must presuppose his will to be free. Freedom is a
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Transcendental Freedom
As Wick suggests, the validity of the Cl implies that reasons for action may
be independent of empirical influences. 58 If there is any justification for what we
assume whenever we make a practical decision, it is that we can act on grounds of
reason alone. Also, if the same overt act can have both empirical and a priori
grounds, how are we to understand the relation between these two levels of
determination? For Kant, this is a question of transcendental freedom, concerning
how, as rational agents, we can be free from determination by empirical causes,
while products of nature we are still subject to natural causes. Kant's solution is to
say that for practical purposes we can be sure that we are free; but we cannot fully
understand how transcendental freedom is possible, for we are able to understand
only what we can explain according to the canons of empirical science. Beyond
that, human limitations are such that we can know only that transcendental freedom
is not impossible. 59 Also, Wick shows that the long argument of the CPrR is
devoted to these two points, one positive and one negative. 60 We know we are
autonomous, capable of acting according to rules we conceive for ourselves, so that
the Cl is vindicated as a guide for action; but since knowledge too is an expression

necessary presupposition of all action as well as of all thinking. lmmanual Kant. The Moral Law.
Translated by H.J. Paton. (London: Hutchingson & Co., 1961) p. 42.
58
Immanuel Kant. Ethical Philosophy. The complete text of Grounding for the Metaphysics of
Morals and Metaphysical Principle of Virtue. Translated by James W. Ellington, Introduction:
Warner A. Wick (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983) p. xxxiii.
59
Ibid., p. xxxiii.
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of the transcendental autonomy of intelligence, we cannot lift ourselves up by our
bootstraps and achieve full knowledge of the ultimate grounds of both knowledge
and action.
Indeed, as Kant shows in the first Critique,
"Theoretical knowledge has limits: It applies only to
the world as we experience it, the phenomenal world.
We cannot say that the determinism holding in the
realm of phenomena holds beyond it as well, in the
noumenal world. If we think of ourselves as
belonging to the noumenal as well as the phenomenal
world, then we can see how in one respect we may be
beings bound in a web of mechanistic determination,
while in another respect we are the free rational
agents morality supposes us to be. Our theoretical
beliefs and our practical presuppositions of freedom
do not come into any conflict." (CPR, 30)
Thus, justification of the moral law is located in the idea of freedom.

Autonomy and Freedom Leads to "Duty and Obligation"
Again, Kant finds that the "fact of reason" is what shows us that we are free,
and, importantly, it shows that we have moral obligations. 61 His claim is that
because the fact of reason is revealed to us through our moral awareness, it also
shows that we are bound by unconditional obligations. As Schneewind suggests,
"Because we know we are bound by such obligations,
we know also that we can do what we are obligated to
do. This means that we can do it, no matter what the
circumstances and no matter what has gone on
60
61

Ibid., p. xxxiiL
There are many interpretations of exactly what Kant means by "fact of reason."
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before. In other words, awareness of categorical
obligations contains awareness of freedom." 62
Kant therefore treats freedom as the ground of our having moral obligations,
and our awareness of categorical imperatives as the ground of our knowledge that
we are free. 63 Also, in the morality through which we govern ourselves, we notice
that there are some actions we simply have to do. 64 We impose a moral law on
ourselves and the law gives rise to obligation, to a necessity to act in certain ways.
Also, Kant does not see morality as springing from virtuous dispositions that make
us want to help others. He sees it as always a struggle. Virtue itself is defined in
terms of struggle. It is "moral strength of will" in overcoming temptations to
transgress the

law. 6 ~

Law (or Right) is prior to virtue, and must control desires to

help others as well as desires to harm. 66
62

J. B. Schneewind. "Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral philosophy."
The Cambridge Companion to Kant. (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 330.
63
Allison, too. interprets Kant's idea of the fact of reason in this way. He suggests Kant is here
arguing that this idea can serve as the basis for a deduction of freedom. Allison, a true Kantian, is
sympathetic to the Kantian enterprise. However, like many critics and other Kantians, finds that
Kant's idea of"the fact of reason," or the "conceivability" of freedom, has serious difficulties.
Henry Allison. Kant's Theory of Freedom. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990) p. 233-236.
64
This become problematic also. It is the problem of"ought" vs "must." The criticism wielded at
"Kantians:' is that their theories lack practically because the principle(s) upon which it rest requires
a strict separation of"have to" and "is or ought." As suggested in chapter one, the critics find that
the separation necessarily fails to answer the question of how moral insight can be realized in
practice.
65
J. B. Schneewind. "Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral philosophy."
The Cambridge Companion to Kant. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 332.
66
Similarly, Rawls shows that in the CPrR Kant finds that writers who do not regard freedom as a
transcendental predicate of the causality of persons who have a place in the natural order but are not
entirely of it, " .. deprive us of the great revelation which we experience through our practical reason
by means of the moral law - the revelation of an intelligible world through realization of the
otherwise transcendent concept of freedom; they deprive us of the moral law itself, which assumes
absolutely no empirical ground of detennination. Therefore, it would be necessary to add
something here as a protection against this delusion and to expose empiricism in its naked
superficiality." Further, Rawls shows Kant as suggesting, "lfby some philosophical or other
doctrine we were to be convinced that the moral law is a delusion, and our moral sensibility simply
an artifact of nature to perpetuate the species or a social contrivance to make institutions stable and
secure, we would be in danger oflosing our humanity, even though we cannot. Kant thinks. lose it
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Finally, in order to further justify his principle (he no longer seeks proof of
it), Kant shows there are two matters, other than freedom, on which practical reason
requires us to accept beliefs that can be neither proven nor disproven theoretically.
One concerns our hopes for our own private futures, the other concerns our hopes
for the future of humanity. In one case we are led by morality to have certain
religious beliefs; in the other, to have certain views about history and progress. In
the CPrR Kant argues not only that we must think of ourselves as free moral agents
but also that we must see ourselves as immortal, and as living in a universe
governed by a providential intelligence through whose intervention in the course of
nature the virtuous are rewarded and the vicious punished. 67 We must have these
beliefs, Kant holds, because morality requires each of us to make ourselves
perfectly virtuous - to give ourselves a character in which the dictates of the
categorical imperative are never thwarted by the passions and desires. It also
requires that happiness be distributed in accordance with virtue. The former cannot
be done in a finite amount of time, so we must believe that we each have something
like an infinite amount oftime available for carrying out the task, or at least for
approaching closer and closer to completion. The latter is not possible if the
mechanisms of nature are the sole ordering force in the universe, nature being
indifferent to virtue and vice. Hence we must believe that there is some nonnatural
ordering force that will intervene to bring about what morality requires. 6s

altogether. The empiricist "delusion," must not be allowed to take from us the glorious disclosure
of our autonomy made known to us through the moral law as an idea of pure reason. Philosophy as
defense ... is to prevent this loss." John Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," Kant and
Political Philosophy (London: Yale University Press, 1993) p. 317.
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3. APPLICATION - KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The discussion so far has been mostly philosophical. Kant now sketches the
outlines of moral philosophy as a substantive intellectual discipline. (As Wick
points out, in moral philosophy, some empirical concepts are needed in order to
relate the fundamental law to "the human condition. "69) This is the business of the
MM. 70 Gregor, suggesting that this is the area of Kant's philosophy receiving the
greatest criticism, shows that it also receives the least attention. By considering the
relation of laws to ends, to the capacity for free choice, Kant explains the
application of the categorical imperative. 11
Gregor notes that the will, as pure reason applied to the capacity for choice
irrespective of its objects, does not have within it the matter of the law "so ... there
is nothing it can make the supreme law and determining ground of choice except
the form, the fitness of maxims of choice to be universal law. " 12 However, maxims
contain objects of choice, both in the sense of ends (central to the Doctrine of
Virtue in the MM) and in the sense of what can be put to use in effecting whatever
ends one has (central to the Doctrine ofRight in the MM). Thus:
"Applied to the capacity for choice with respect to its
objects, the will gives rise to laws enabling us to put
different kinds of objects to use - that is, determining
what rights we have or can acquire - and laws
prescribing what ends we ought to set for ourselves 67

Ibid., p. 317.
Ibid., p. 332. (CPrR, 5:122-32/126 -36)
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Immanuel Kant. Ethical Philosophy. The complete text of Grounding for the Metaphysics of
Morals and Metaphysical Principle of Virtue. Translated by James W. Ellington, Introduction:
Warner A. Wick (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983) p. xxxix.
70
As with many areas of Kant's moral philosophy, an in-depth review far exceeds the limits of this
essay. I have elected, therefore. to briefly discuss the purpose of its two parts, Right and Virtue.
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Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals, translated with an introduction by Mary Gregor.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p.6.
72
Ibid., p.6.
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68

that is, what virtues or moral dispositions we ought to
acquire. Whether Kant's moral philosophy is an
"empty formalism" can be decided only after a
careful study of the Metaphysics of Morals, and this
is not the work one would have expected on the basis
of the Groundwork alone. In fact, Kant's references
there to his future "metaphysics of morals" would
suggests that he had not given serious consideration
to how he would go about applying the formal
principle of all duties so as to obtain "the whole
system." 13
Indeed, in this final work in the critical moral philosophy, Kant attempts to
give content to the CI. This work comprises two parts, the Doctrine of Right (or
Justice), which deals with the rights that people have or can acquire, and the
Doctrine o.f Virtue, which deals with the virtues they ought to acquire. Also, as

Gregor points out, the importance of the MM is that here Kant shows although the
will is pure practical reason, within the will there must be some structure, and
hence some differentiation expressed in "obligation." Further, Kant's use of
"humanity" throughout the MM suggests that duties are to be derived from the
GMl11's treatment of humanity as an "objective end," that the subject of all ends

never be treated as a mere means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but
also as an end in itself. 74 If pure reason is to be practical it must be able to
73

Ibid., p. 7.
As Rawls notes, Kant's aim is to convince us that as purely natural beings, endowed with the
powers of the rational but not the reasonable, we cannot oppose the love of life, nevertheless we can
do so as natural beings endowed with humanity, that is, the powers of the reasonable in union with
moral sensibility. "Moreover, our consciousness of the moral law discloses to us that we can stand
fast against the totality of our natural desires; and that in turn discloses our capacity to act
independently of the natural order. Our consciousness of the moral law could not do this unless that
law was not only unconditional and sufficient of itself to determine our will but also had all the
features of a principle of pure practical reason. These features must be exhibited in our moral
thought and feeling in some such manner as the Cl-procedure represents them. Knowledge that we
can act from a law of that kind - a law that is a principle of autonomy-is what discloses our freedom
to us." ." John Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," Kant and Political Philosophy
(London: Yale University Press, 1993) p. 317.
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determine actions (as the CPrR showed). "But it can do so only through the agent's
maxims, the principles on which he proposes to act; and whereas laws issue from

his will, maxims issue from his "capacity for free choice. " 75
"This is to say that practical reason has two functions
or activities: that of giving laws and that of adopting
maxims of action. It is because of these two
activities that Kant can speak of practical reason
putting itself under obligation...Thus pure practical
reason as lawgiving merely presents to an agent the
formal principle expressed in the categorical
imperative, "So act that your maxim could become a
universal law," and thereby exercises constraint upon
his capacity for choice. " 76

The Doctrine o,f Right (Justice)
Kant defines the Doctrine of Right as the sum of laws for which an external
lawgiving is possible. Yet, what is Right? Kant answers,
"The concept of Right, insofar as it is related to an
obligation corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept
of Right), has to do, first, only with the external and
indeed practical relation of one person to another,
insofar as their actions, as facts, can have (direct or
indirect) influence on each other... second, it does not
signify the relation of one's choice to the mere wish
75

Gregor shows that Kant's definition of a "thing" taken from CPrR introduces the tenn "capacity
for free choice" (Willkur), which was absent from the GMMbut is essential to its cardinal concept
of obligation. She shows the distinction between "will" and "willkur" as " ..the subject imposing
obligation is a person regarded as having pure practical reason, whereas the subject put under
obligation is the same person regarded as having a capacity for free choice." Immanuel Kant. The
Metaphysics of Morals, translated with an introduction by Mary Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991) p. 4.
76
A capacity for free choice is, then, a capacity to set ends for yourself.
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(hence also the mere need) of the other, as in actions
of beneficence or callousness, but only a relation to
the other's choice. Third, in this reciprocal relation of
choice no account at all is taken of the matter of

choice, that is, of the end each has in mind with the
object he wants; it is not asked, for example, whether
someone who buys goods from me for his own
commercial use will gain by the transaction or not.
All that is in question is the form in the relation of
choice on the part of both, insofar as choice is
regarded merely as.free, and whether the action of
one can be united with the freedom of the other in
accordance with a universal law. Right is therefore
the sum of the conditions under which the choice of
one can be united with the choice of another in
accordance with a universal law of freedom."
(MM, 56)

Summarily, the Doctrine of Right brings out freedom under laws. People's
compliance with the system of laws brings the external use of their free choice into
accord with that of every other. In the Doctrine of Right Kant derives empirical
content for the formal principle of Right by considering objects of choice (i.e ..
property, contract, etc.), and determining, to the extent possible in "metaphysical
first principles," what rights human beings have or can acquire. By contrast, in the

Doctrine of Virtue he derives empirical content for its formal principle by
considering what ends can hold for everyone or what virtues are required of a
human being.
Thus, the Right is located where an end is found to have the required form.
As Gregor notes, the will, which is "a capacity for desire that, in adopting a rule,
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also gives it as a universal law," contains a law prescribing the adoption of that end.
Also, with regard to ends as the "matter of choice," Kant's procedure is to begin

with ends that we would adopt merely on the basis of inclination and submit our
maxims of pursuing such ends to the test of whether they could qualify for giving a
universal law. 77 Also, as Kersing notes,
"Kant shares the conviction, common to all variants
of natural right theory, that there is an objective,
timelessly valid and universally binding principle of
right, which is accessible to human knowledge,
which draws an irrevocable boundary between that
which is right and that which is not that obligates
everyone, and which contains the criterion with the
assistance of which the correctness of human action
can be judged. But in distinction from all his
predecessors, in the determination of the concept and
principle of Right he appeals neither to empirical
human nature nor to the nature of a teleological
worldview that includes reason, but solely to the
legislative reason, purified of all anthropological
features and excluding all elements of nature, of a
metaphysics of freedom. In the philosophy of right
and in the political philosophy that is grounded upon
it, exactly as was already done in moral philosophy,
the way is thereby barred to every application of
natural purposes, human needs and interest, and
substantive ethical considerations in Kant's
argument. " 78

77

Kant suggests the reason for dividing the MM into two parts is that the concept of freedom
requires a division of duties into those of "outer" or "external" freedom and those of "inner" or
"internal" freedom . From this, Kant distinguishes two kinds of duties, duties of Right and duties of
Virtue - the first being directly ethical and the fonner being indirectly ethical. Immanuel Kant. The
Metaphysics of Morals, translated with an introduction by Mary Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991) p. 6.
78
Wolfgang Kersting. "Politics, freedom, and order: Kant's political philosophy," The Cambridge
Companion to Kant. (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.342. We can now see clearly
that this is what causes many to split with Kant, finding his moral point of view cold, unsubstantive
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As Schneewind points out, only the properties of reason itself are available
to make determinate the nonempirical concept of Right: lawfulness, universality,
formality, and necessity. 79 And, as far as its structure and potential value as a
criterion are concerned, the principle of Right cannot be distinguished from the
categorical imperative. Like the latter, it must contain a universalization argument.
Indeed, Kant's sphere of Right is equivalent to his "theory of justice."
(Recht, can be translated either 'right' or 'justice'). Thus, technically, Kant's
doctrine of Right is a theory of justice. And, justice concerns that which is
universally Right for everyone.
The Doctrine o[Virtue (Material or Normative Ethics)
Briefly, and as suggested above, the Doctrine of Virtue brings inner freedom
under laws. As Gregor suggests, compliance with the system of laws comprising it
brings one's capacity for free choice into accord with one's will. One's inner
freedom is in direct proportion to the responsiveness of one's choice to moral
constraint and in inverse proposition to its responsiveness to constraint by natural
means. Only a virtuous disposition can lead one to adopt ends on the basis of their
being duties and, in tum, fulfillment of duties of virtue strengthens one's virtuous
disposition. Kant gives many examples of how this applies. In each example he
shows the CI as setting limits to the maxims it is permissible for us to adopt and to

or empty of the kind of content which, essentially, applies to those "communal" realities which soo
badly need such attention.
79
J. B. Schneewind, "Autonomy, obligation and virtue: An overview ofKant's moral philosophy."
The Cambridge Companion to Kant. (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 332.
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act on, and he explains his meanings by showing that (deceit, malevolence, sloth
and other vices) could not be made into rules of conduct for everyone. 80

The State, Political Authority, and Coercion
It should now be clear that Kant derives his universal principle of Right

independently of distinctively ethical considerations, i.e., merely by specifying the
condition under which one agent's external use of his freedom can be compatible
with that of every other, that is, the condition under which his actions, as means to
whatever end he has adopted, will leave all others free to act for whatever ends they
have set for themselves. By force, threats, or deception others may compel
someone to perform actions that are not means to his own ends but only to theirs.
Such compulsion is wrong or inconsistent with the external exercise of everyone's
freedom. As Carr shows, " .. Kant argues that the defense of a condition of justice
80

It is unfortunate that this thesis cannot accommodate an in-depth review of Kant's all important
examples, as they indeed often provide sufficient persuasion for his ideas. Also, his critics often
apply their criticisms of his ethical theory direct1y to his examples. However, l shall mention here
that such criticisms commonly note that it is a pity Kant has so little to say about ideals of conduct.
As Action points out, Kant does not explore the field of maxims that are not excluded by the test of
universal legislation. Action also argues that Kant is a rigorist in that he thought that the claims of
duty are always absolute against inclinations and against ideals that violate the moral law. Further,
he suggests Kant is a rigorist in that he believed that there can be no exceptions to any basic moral
rules. "He seems not to have given due weight to situations, much discussed by philosophers since
his day, in which one moral claim conflicts with another. Thus he argued that it is wrong to tell a
lie even if it appears to be the only way of saving the life of a man who is being pursued by a
murderer." H.B. Action. Kant's Moral Philosophy. (St. Martin's Press, Macmillan, 1970) p. 63.
Action also suggests that it should be noticed that Kant's account of the CI does not require him to
adopt this most unplausible view. In discussing this problem Kant says that even if the lie might
help the threatened man - and it might not - it would harm humanity as a whole. But if he had
applied the Principle of Universal Law to this case he would have asked whether the maxim of
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permits the use of coercion and therefore that 'right' or 'justice' means the same
thing as the 'authorization to use coercion."81 From the concept of right Kant
immediately concludes that human beings, merely by virtue of their "humanity,"
have one and only one innate right: the right to freedom of action. That anyone is
authorized to use coercion against someone who would interfere with those actions
which are compatible with everyone's external use of freedom follows directly from
considerations of what is right in accordance with an external law. All other rights
must be acquired by acts of choice ... and Kant is far more concerned with how
someone can rightly be coerced to refrain from doing what would not interfere with
anyone's innate right to freedom of action. ("Granting one's innate right to freedom
of action, one is in rightful possession of one's own person and of objects one is
holding or possesses physically: No one can hinder him in his exclusive use of
them without wronging him by infringing upon that outer freedom of his which is
compatible with everyone's use of free choice.")
Again, as Schneewind points out, Kant's interest in the social and political
implications of autonomy is shown in many places (i.e., in his essay "What is

Enlightenment" and also in the work "Perpetual Peace.") 82 He suggests that what
stands out in Kant's vision of the morality by which we must govern ourselves is
that some actions we simply have to do. Again, we impose a moral law on
telling a lie when an innocent man is threatened in such circumstances could be universalized, and it
seem obvious that it could be. Ibid., p. 65.
81
Craig L. Carr, "Kant's Theory ofPolitical Authority." History Of Politcal Thought. Vol. X No. 4.
p.719.
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J.B. Schneewind, "Autonomy, obligation and virtue: An overview ofKant's moral philosophy."
The Cambridge Companion to Kant. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 310.
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ourselves, and the law gives rise to obligation, to a necessity to act in certain ways.
Law is prior to virtue, and must control desires to help others as well as desires to

harm. 83 Further,

"A society built around the virtues of benevolence
and kindness is for Kant a society requiring not only
inequality but servility as well. If nothing is properly
mine except what someone graciously gives me, I am
forever dependent on how the donor feels toward me.
My independence as an autonomous being is
threatened. Only ifl can claim that the others have to
give me what is mine by right can this be avoided .
.. Kant did not deny the moral importance of
beneficent action, but his theoretical emphasis on the
importance of obligation or moral necessity reflects
his rejection of benevolent paternalism and the
servility that goes with it, just as the centrality of
autonomy in his theory shows his aim of limiting
religious and political control of our lives." 84

Also, Kersting notes that in the MM, Kant demonstrated that his formal
principle or morality justifies the use of coercion in the state yet simultaneously
places strict limits on the ends the state can justifiably pursue by coercive means,
and the same principle implies a detailed series of ethical duties to ourselves and
others that go beyond the limits of positive legislation in such a state. 85

83

Ibid., p. 310.
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4. CONCLUSION

Through his moral philosophy, Kant provided an entirely new theoretical
foundation for justification in practical philosophy, which has come to be
predominant today. As Wolfgang Kersting notes,
"In the previous history of practical philosophy
foundations and first principles were sought in
objective ideas, in a normative constitution of the
cosmos, in the will of God, in the nature of man, or in
prudence in the service of self-interest; but Kant was
convinced that these starting points were without
exception inadequate for the foundation of
unconditional practical laws, and that human reason
could only concede absolute practical necessity and
obligatoriness to norms that arose from its own
legislation. " 86
Further, Kant found that we are subject to the laws of reason alone, and with
this recognition, he freed us from the domination of theological absolutism and the
bonds of teleological natural law, and, likewise elevated us above the prosaic
banalities of the doctrine of prudence. 87 In finding that human beings may and must
obey only their own reason; Kant finds that in this lies their dignity as well as their
exacting and burdensome moral vocation. 88

Having now considered Kant's moral point of view, we are better able to
review Hegel ideas on morality. The issues between Kant and Hegel are
undoubtedly few, especially when one thinks of the enormous base of their moral
and political thought. Yet, as I have attempted to emphasize, those differences
which do exist are very important.
86
87
88

Ibid., p. 342.
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Hegel's Moral Point of View
"What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. On
this conviction the plain man like the philosopher takes his
stand, and from it philosophy starts in its study of the universe
of mind as well as the universe of nature ... To comprehend
what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is
reason." HEGEL

l. THE BACKGROUND

In the realm of political philosophy, the works of G.W.F. Hegel are among
the most important of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century. This alone makes it
important to understand him. Yet, Hegel's profound ideas led him to some
conclusions that strike the modem reader as bizarre, or even absurd. So, although
Hegel's thought has been experiencing a renaissance since the 1960's, Hegel
remains suspicious in the eyes of many. This is due not only to his notorious
obscurity, which has put him at odds with the premium placed upon clarity in
contemporary philosophy, but also to his indulgence in metaphysics. However, as
Allen Wood suggests, Hegel's philosophy retains its force to the present day and is
often summoned by protractors of liberal political theory. This chapter serves to
explicate some of Hegel's arguments and insights.
A synopsis of any sort should be straightforward. However, as Hegel's
philosophy is indeed obscure and challenging, this task is especially difficult. 89 Part
89

Dante Germino suggests the problem arises from the fact that Hegel's writings are so rarely read
in the English speaking world, and when read, hardly taken seriously enough, so that his most
complex arguments are difficult to comprehend. Additionally, he shows this fate is attributable in
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of my strategy for making the lofty heights of Hegel's thought introductory is to
gently approach three basic features of his philosophy: self-actualization, absolute
"Spirit," and absolute freedom. Though deeply complex, these features are
foundational to Hegel's thought, and so it is wise to unpack them early. Following
this, I can further clarify these ideas in later chapters where Hegel's philosophy is
discussed more fluidly. Obviously, this order, and/or strategy, is not intended to
suggest anything about how Hegel himself would have chosen to present his ideas.
Rather, it provides an opportunity to evaluate separately several critical parts of his
philosophy.

A Note On Hegel's Development

The most significant of all of Hegel's development was the state of German
philosophy in the period in which he worked, particularly as it was being
influenced by the philosophy of Kant. Indeed, we find that both philosophers were
reacting to the philosophical trends of their day. Kant in his search for a middle
ground between the positions of the rationalists and the skeptics, sought to achieve
a precise understanding of the possibilities and limits of reason, and Hegel, in his
reaction to the romantics that followed Kantian influences, sought a similar end.Q0
Also, as Taylor notes, we find evidence that Hegel repeatedly read Kant,
undertaking a full review and criticism of Kant's philosophy. 91 His early writings
show that he was a devoted follower of Kant. (Hegel is indebted to Kant for many
of the ideas contained in his works.) Later, Hegel splits with Kant. His 'mature'
part to Hegel's predilection for system construction and his fondness for needlessly ponderous
jargon. Dante Germino. Modern Western Political Thought: Machiavelli to Marx (Chicago: Rand
McNally & Company, 1972) p.320.
90
Charles Taylor. Hegel and Modem Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 11.
91
Ibid., p. I I.
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writings directly criticize Kant's philosophy, and the advantage of this is that
Hegel's critiques or treatments of Kant's philosophy are in-depth, so that we can
witness Hegel's thought pitted against Kant's. Their differences, although few,
prove to be of very considerable importance, as we shall see.

2. HEGEL'S ETHICAL THOUGHT

In the Preface of the Philosophy of Right (Hegel's major work in ethics,
hereafter PR) Hegel states:
" .. the truth about Right, Ethics, and the state is as old
as its public recognition in the law of the land, in the
morality of everyday life, and in religion. What more
does this truth require - since the thinking mind is not
content to possess it in this ready fashion? It requires
to be grasped in thought as well; the content which is
already rational in principle must win the form of
rationality and so appear well-founded to
untrammeled thinking .... A [serious] difficulty arises,
however, from the fact that man thinks and tries to
find in thinking both his freedom and the basis of
ethical life. But however lofty, however divine, the
right of thought may be, it is perverted into wrong if
it is only this [opining] which passes for thinking and
if thinking knows itself to be free only when it
diverges from what is universally recognized and
valid and when it has discovered how to invent for
itself some particular character."92 (PR, pf.3)

Likewise, Allen Wood shows that ethics must be grounded in a knowledge
of human beings that enables us to say that some modes of life are suited to our
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nature, whereas others are not. 93 And, in that sense, ethical theories generally may
be regarded as theories of human self-actualization. 94 Further, the common pitfall
of ethical theories is that their conception of human nature is too thin. one-sided,
and abstract, or else too much dictated by the needs of some convenient theoretical
program. 95 By contrast, Hegel's ethical theory is based on a complex conception of
human nature which systematizes a number of different human self-images. and
Hegel grounds this conception in his theory of history which attempts to show how
the different elements arose through a process of cultural development. 96
Wood also shows that Hegel's philosophy cannot be comfortably classified
either as a teleological theory, like Aristotle's, based on an end or good to be
pursued, or as a deontical theory, like Kant's, based on a commandment or principle
to be followed. 97 Instead, it is an agent-oriented or self-actualization theory, based
on a conception of the human self to be exemplified or instantiated. 98 The theory
recommends principles when they are the principles such a self would follow, and
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ends when they are the ends it would pursue. 99 Further, Hegel's theory is based not
on one conception of the self, but on a system of such conceptions, which
determines Hegel's "system of right" in the PR. He notes:
"Hegel sees these conceptions as the results of a long
historical development, in which the human spirit
collectively has successively deepened its knowledge
of itself. In the sphere "abstract right," the individual
is conceived as a "person" .. a free volitional agent,
capable of abstracting completely from its desires and
situation, and demanding recognition for an external
·sphere in which the dignity of its personality can be
actualized .. Within this sphere, including the person's
body and life (but extending to all its property), the
person's right of arbitrary freedom must be
recognized by others." 100

Indeed, Hegel identifies and defines the two spheres 'abstract right' and

'morality' early on in PR, and attaches tremendous significance to both.

Abstract Right
Wood states abstract right is based on a distinctive human self-image: the

person, "a being capable of arbitrary free choice and demanding respect for this
capacity in the form of an external sphere within which to exercise it .. " 101 Further,
a person is therefore a subject of rights, .. ''the sort of rights that the tradition calls
"natural rights" and today usually go by the name of "human rights." 102
Additionally, Hegel identifies abstract will, consciously self-contained, as

personality. As Hegel states,
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"Man's chief glory is to be a person, and yet in spite
of that the bare abstraction, 'person,' is somewhat
contemptuous in its very expression. "Person" is
essentially different from 'subject', since 'subject' is
only the possibility of personality; every living thing
of any sort is a subject. A person, then, is a subject
aware of this subjectivity, since in personality it is of
myself alone that I am aware. A person is a unit of
freedom aware of its sheer independence." (PR,
p. 235)

Morality
The second, but less abstract sphere to which Hegel refers, is "morality." 101
Here the individual is conceived as a subject, an agent possessing moral
responsibility and a distinctive good or welfare of its own, which makes claims on
the subjective will of others. 104 As Wood states, Hegel shows that morality is
concerned with our responsibility for actions and their consequences, with the
values of subjective freedom (rather than "objective freedom" as found in the
sphere of abstract right), and the right of individuals to determine the course of their
own lives and to take satisfaction in their choices. 105 Thus, self-actualization in the
moral sphere consists in the actualization of the subject through the conformity of
its insight and intention to the good. He shows that in the sphere of morality the
will is infinite, not merely in itself but also for itself. Also, this reflection of the
will into itself and its explicit awareness of its identity makes the person into the
subject.
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3. SELF ACTUALIZATION

As suggested earlier, Hegel's ethical theory is based on a complex
conception of human nature, which systematizes a number of different human selfimages. And, these images manifest themselves at different "stages of
consciousness." Hegel offers his most in-depth discussion of the different forms or
stages of consciousness in which his "system of right" is based in his work
Phenomenology of Mind. Here, he views each one from inside and shows how
more limited forms of consciousness necessarily developed into more adequate
ones. 106 He describes this as 'the exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon'
because he sees the development of consciousness as a development toward forms
of consciousness that more fully grasps reality, and that culminates in 'absolute
knowledge,' or the actual knowledge of what truly is. 101 Singer defines these as:
1) "Sense-certainty" - this is the most primitive form of consciousness
which does nothing but grasp what is in front of it at any given moment. ws Sensecertainty seems to have a strong claim to being genuine knowledge, for it is directly
aware of the "this" without imposing on it the distorting filters of a conceptual
scheme involving space, time or any other categories. w" However, the simple
recognition of "things" does not allow one to describe it very well. To do so
presupposes a general ordering of things, including our concepts of time and space,
although, for Hegel these terms are also problematic because "here,': "now" and
"this" are universals and there are of course more than one of each of these. Singer
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suggests that with this, Hegel believes he has established the impossibility of
knowledge without universal concepts. To achieve knowledge, Hegel suggests, we
must allow our mind to play a more active role in ordering the information received
by our senses. 110
2) "Perception" - at this stage consciousness classifies objects according to
their universal properties. However, this proves inadequate, and so at the next
level, "understanding," consciousness imposes its own laws on reality. 111
3) "Understanding" - concepts employed in this process, notions like gravity
and force, are not things we see existing in reality, but constructs made by our
understandings to help us grasp reality. In this stage, consciousness is in effect
trying to understand its own creations. It has itself for its object, and this means
that consciousness has reached the point at which it can reflect upon itself. 112 It is
latent self-consciousness. Further, Hegel shows:
" .. at this stage, knowledge of the Thing is still not
complete; it must be known not only from the
standpoint of the immediacy of being and of
determinateness, but also as essence or inner being,
as Self. This occurs in moral self-consciousness.
This is aware that its knowledge is a knowledge of
what is absolutely essential, it knows that being is
simply and solely pure willing and knowing; it is
nothing else but this willing and knowing; anything
else has only unessential being; i.e. not intrinsic
being, only its empty husk." 113 (Phen, 482)
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4) "Self-consciousness" - this idea, though greatly anticipated after
reviewing the previous stages, is the most difficult to grasp. However, Hegel's
primary message here is that self-consciousness can only develop in a context of
social interaction. So, a child growing up in total isolation from all other selfconscious beings would never develop mentally beyond the level of understanding,
or mere consciousness, because self-consciousness grows out of a social life. 114 It is
by recognizing ourselves in others that we become self-conscious. This may be
thought of as a process of "synthesizing" (always important to Hegel) the self and
the other.
Terry Pinkard explains,
"Universal self-consciousness" is thus a key category
for Hegel's theory. He also characterizes this
abstractly as "the affirmative knowing of one's self in
the other self." Universal self-consciousness is thus
the idea of a shared and reflective understanding of
what we as agents essentially are; it is opposed to the
earlier inarticulate self-understanding that
characterized 'life' and the incoherent selfunderstandings that characterize the forms of
domination of masters and slaves, and lords and
servants. The important step for Hegel is to see that
universal self-consciousness does not denote any
metaphysical entity standing behind appearance that
determines it (as would the Kantian notion of selfconsciousness synthesizing its experience) but rather
the kind of reflective self-understanding articulated in
the essential categories of particular linguistic and
cultural communities. " 115
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Hegel calls those principles of self-understanding that structure human
communities spirit, and this, for Hegel, is the basic categorical structure of
communal subjectivity, or, the human community itself. 116 As Pinkard shows, in
practical terms, this becomes the idea of a self-conscious individual rational agent
taking himself as the absolute ground of appearance, owing respect to no law not
autonomously given to himself by himself. 111 Indeed, Hegel is suggesting that we
should look only to the common appearing world that we as persons share, and
understand that world in terms of the various conceptually expressible systems in
which the world is described and thought about by the human community. 118
Behind that world there is no hidden metaphysical substructure determining things.
There is only the system of"Spirit," the inferential social space constituting the
essential self understandings of the people of a particular linguistic and cultural
community, and the world they inhabit. 119

4. "SPIRIT"

As Taylor notes, Hegel's idea of "Spirit" or Geist, although he is often
called 'God' and although Hegel claimed to be clarifying Christian theology, is not
the God of traditional theism. 120 On the contrary, It is a spirit who lives as spirit
only through men, and men are the indispensable vehicles of his spiritual existence,
as consciousness, rationality and will. 121 Further, he states:
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"But at the same time Geist is not reducible to man;
he is not identical with the human spirit, since he is
also the spiritual reality underlying the universe as a
whole, and as a spiritual being he has purposes and he
realizes ends which cannot be attributed to finite
spirits qua finite, but which finite spirits on the
contrary serve. For the mature Hegel, man comes to
himself in the end when he sees himself as the
vehicle of a larger spirit." 122
Thus, to recognize Geist is to recognize that the spiritual functions of
thought, perception, understanding, etc., are all attributed to it. Spirit is the Idea. it
is the Absolute, and, (following Singer's more contemporary interpretation) it is
"mind."
Wartenberg suggests that some view Hegel as an idealist because he asserts
this single supra-individual entity, Geist, and shows that everything which exists is
to be thought of as part of the development of this single, supra-human
individual. 123 (Geist has the structure of a subject and is something that has
consciousness.) Also, since Geist is a trans-individual subject, this interpretation
shows how Hegel rejects the subjectivist tendencies of earlier European philosophy
by developing a metaphysics that goes beyond the individual subject, thus making
Hegel's idealism 'non-assimilable' to the subjective idealism that asserts that things
are dependent upon the individual mind of the human knower.'24 Wartenberg also
shows that the dominant tendency among contemporary interpretations of Hegel.
however, is away from this "spirit monist" interpretation. These other, primarily
non-metaphysical interpretations, are predominant among interpreters influenced by
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analytic philosophy. 125 And, these interpretations show Hegel finding that the
various strivings of individual human selves are collectively the expressions of a
single historical tendency or movement with an intelligibility of its own. 120
The selfs awareness of its "self-relation" to Geist is what Hegel calls

"subjective spirit." 121 And, Wood suggests it is nothing over and above the
consciousness that individuals have of Geist's activity. In so far as human beings
give Geist's strivings after self-actualization the external, substantial shape of a
functioning social order, Hegel calls this social order "objective spirit." 128
Additionally, it is only in individuals that the powers of Geist becomes conscious
and actual; and, (similar to the earlier discussion of self-actualization) upon
recognizing this, the individual has knowledge of the absolute, or absolute
knowledge, which is equivalent to knowledge of reality itself.
Clearly, Hegel's conception of Geist is quite challenging. Yet, it is the crux
of his philosophy. Like Kant, Hegel seeks to salvage "faith" (in God), and with it
morality. Recall, Hegel is offended by Kant's belittling of man's capacity for
reason. However, he recognizes that Kant's purpose in creating a wedge between
"thought" and "being" is to show how God can exist, and yet, not be 'knowable.'
In this way, Kant preserves faith. Respecting Kant's intention, Hegel still believes
his theory of Geist is preferable, because it not only is the "Absolute' (truth), but
also it esteems man's reasoning capacity, and thereby, philosophy as well. Indeed,
Hegel speaks harshly against Kant's dualism where he finds that it is damaging to
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the practice of philosophy. He suggests that where man does not believe he can
know the world, he will not seek to know it. With his own metaphysical theory,
Hegel intends to synthesize Kant's dualisms, and restore our recognition of the
"rational as the actual." 129

5. ABSOLUTE FREEDOM

Hegel's ethical theory is intended to show how history, itself, has a goal. As
Germino puts it:
"Man to Hegel is a being of reason and will,
potentially capable of grasping in his consciousness
the principles and structures of reality and of
articulating his experiences in philosophically valid
symbols. The audacity of Hegel's philosophy stems
from his supreme confidence in the capacity of
human thought to comprehend and portray the reality
in which man finds himself... As a person man is free.
Freedom for man as such, and not only for one or a
few, is the goal of world history." 130
Through the process of self-actualization, becoming self-conscious- or
conscious of Geist (the strivings of a functioning social order) man becomes free.
And, Hegel finds that history is at its deepest level nothing other than the
actualization of freedom through the instrumentality of the modem state.

129

Recall, Hegel needs to prove that Kant's dualism is unreasonable. His goal is to prove that
morality must be based on 'what is,' not 'what ought to be,' as Kant prescribes. Therefore, he must

refuted Kant's assertion that man cannot know 'what is' with any certainty, for what man
understands is only constructs of his own mind.
130
Dante Germino. Modem Western Political Thought: Machiavelli to Marx (Chicago: Rand
McNally & Company, 1972) p. 323.
56

I want to suggest here that a more contemporary interpretation would show
Hegel viewing "modernity," generally, as the epoch which "actualizatizes freedom
for all."131

The Modern State
Hegel states:
"The state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the
actualization of freedom; and it is an absolute end of
reason that freedom should be actual. The state is
mind on earth and consciously realizing itself there.
In nature, on the other hand, mind actualizes itself
only as its own other, as mind asleep. Only when it is
present in consciousness, when it knows itself as a
really existent object, is it the state. In considering
freedom, the starting-point must be not individuality,
the single self-consciousness, but only the essence of
self-consciousness; for whether man knows it or not,
this essence is externally realized as a self-subsistent
power in which single individuals are only moments.
The march of God in the world, that is what the state
is ... .In the state everything depends on the unity of
universal and particular. In modem times, however,
we make claims for private judgment, private willing,
and private conscience ... Jn Plato's state, subjective
freedom does not count, because people have their
occupations assigned to them by the Guardians." (PR,
p. 279-280)
Hegel found that the modem state must recognize the rights of individuality.
and these include variations in property and wealth. Following Kant, he suggests
that as a person, man is set off from the world of things. It is "unjustifiable and
unethical" to view and treat persons as things. Hegel also finds that with respect to
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things, man possesses 'the absolute right of appropriation." 132 Personality receives
itself through the possession of rights and the subjective recognition of moral
obligations. Rights and duties go together, and, a man who was assigned only
duties and was not seen as the bearer of rights would be a slave. 133 Further, he finds
that slavery is contrary to the dignity of human personality, and men are equal ''in
respect to their personality." 134 He suggests man may alienate his property, may
abandon it to another, insofar as it is a thing external to nature. However, man may
not legitimately alienate those goods, or rather substantive characteristics that
constitute his own private personality and the universal essence of his selfconsciousness for these are "inalienable," and one's right to them is
"imprescriptible. " 135 The individual as person remains inviolable with respect to his
ethical life, religion, and "universal freedom of will. " 136

6. SITTLICKEIT

Hegel's notion of the "self' is not very far from Kant's, as we shall see.
However, their differences are of major importance. As with "self-actualization,'
Hegel finds that the "good life" is achieved not in isolation (i.e .. Kant's radical
individualism) but rather in community with others. 137 Indeed, he finds that the
individual is initiated into the very concept of the "moral life" in the community.
So, although it is possible that clashes may occur between the communitys demand
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and those of the individual conscience, and the individual conscience may err;
Hegel finds that in principle there should be no conflict between the moral aims of
the individual and those of the state. 138 The ends of man and the political
community (which is after all not something alien to the life of its citizens) is the
same: the realization of freedom in the world. 139 Further, it is in ethical life (what
Hegel refers to as Sittlichkeit), the good life in the context of the state that true
freedom is realized and the harmonious integration of the claims and obligations of
the person occurs. 140 Within the political order it is possible for man to become
aware that duty, far from constituting a restriction or hindrance to man, is the
essence of freedom. Essentially, it is in duty that the individual finds his
liberation. 141 Thus, we find that the modern state has a more central_role in Hegel's
ethics and political philosophy. (I will return to this shortly.)
It is often commented that Hegel hopes to "turn Kant's moral thought on its
head," or flip it upside down, in that Hegel finds Kant's prioritization of 'right' (or
justice) over the 'good,' (or what the state or community aspires to) needs to be
reversed. Hegel argues that because the good must serve as the content or basis for
positive law or principles of justice, it is therefore 'superior' to law. And, like
Kant, Hegel has faith in the rational persons willingness to consider his judgments
in relation to abstract right. Man will, on his own, ensure that his judgments align
with those norms and behaviors which the community has identified as necessary.
And, where someone does not act in this manner, state coercion is an reasonable
response. The state, or community, is the embodiment of Geist, and thus, it is a
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moral entity. And, as such, it is justified in asserting such coercion. As we have
seen, the important difference in Kant's moral thought is that he assigns morality to
the individual, and its' practical use (ethics, or political philosophy), is located in
"law." Also, whereas Hegel adamantly opposes this view, contemporary liberal
society supports it. (Returning to in the following chapter.)

Morality and Sittlichkeit

As Taylor suggests, for Hegel morality can only receive a concrete content
in politics, in the design of the society we have to further and sustain. 142 And, this
set of obligations which we have to further and sustain a society founded on the
Idea (what actually exists) is what Hegel calls "Sittlichkeit." This refers to the

moral obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am part. These
obligations are based on established norms and uses, and the crucial characteristic
of Sittlichkeit is that it enjoins us to bring about what already is. Taylor suggests
that this is a paradoxical way of putting it, but in fact the common life which is the
basis of my 'sittlich' obligation is already there in existence. "It is in virtue of it
being an ongoing affair that I have these obligations; my fulfillment of these
obligations is what sustains it and keeps it in being, and, hence, in Sittlichkeit there
is no gap between what ought to be and what is, between Solien and Sein." 14 '
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With Moralitat (which Hegel associates with Kantian ethics) the opposite
holds. Here we have an obligation to realize something which does not exist. 144
What ought to be contrasts with what is. Connected to this, the obligation holds of
me not in virtue of my being part of a larger community life, but as an individual
rational will. 145
Thus, Hegel finds that since Kant identifies ethical obligations with

moralitat, he cannot get beyond this. He finds that since Kant presents an abstract,
formal notion of moral obligation (the CJ), which holds of man as an individual,
and which being defined in contrast to nature (i.e., the state) is in endless opposition
to what is.
And, very importantly, we have now seen how all of Hegel's reproaches
against Kant's moral philosophy are systematically connected to the dualism
between self and nature. For each idea Kant presents in justification of his
principle of morality (the CJ) Hegel will argue that because it remained with a
purely formal notion of reason, rather than the 'particulars' (realities) of society, it
could not provide a content to moral obligation. Because it would not accept the
only valid content, which comes from an ongoing society to which we belong, it
remained an ethic of the individual. And, because it shied away from that larger
life of which we are all apart, it saw the right as forever opposed to the real;
morality and nature are always at loggerheads. 146 The fulfillment of freedom is
when nature (here society) is made over to the demands of reason. 147 Thus, in the
end, the fulfillment of morality comes, only, in a realized Sittlichkeit.

144

Ibid., p. 178.

145

Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 178.

146
147

61

As eluded to earlier, we find that this is the point where Hegel runs counter
to the moral instincts of liberalism then and now; between obligations which are
founded on our membership in some community and those which are not so
contingent which we tend to think transcend the former. Moralitat transcends
Sittlichkeit as the truly universal moral obligations. And, again. as Taylor notes,

"Hegel's reversal of the order and his exalted view of political society is what has
inspired accusations of "Prussianism", state worship, and even proto-Fascism. And
we can already see how wide of the mark these are. " 143 Germino, who comments
similarly, shows that for Hegel the state is not a whole apart from society; it is
society in all its diversity plus the regulative and unifying structure of
government. 149 "This is not an arbitrary government, but a government of laws.'. 1'"
For Hegel, the underlying principle, or essence, of the modem state is the synthesis
of individuality and universality .151
As Hegel states:
"The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But
concrete freedom consists in this, that personal
individuality and its particular interests not only
achieve their complete development and gain explicit
recognition for their right (as they do in the sphere of
the family and civil society) but, for one thing, they
also pass over their own accord into the interest of the
universal, and for another thing, they know and will
the universal; they even recognize it as their own
substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim
and are active in its pursuit. The result is that the
universal does not prevail or achieve completion
except along with particular interests and through the
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co-operation of particular knowing and willing; and
individuals likewise do not live as private persons for
their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing
these they will the universal in light of the universal.
and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the
universal end. The principle of modem states has
prodigious strength and depth because it allows the
principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination
in the extreme of self-subsistent personal
particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back
to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in
the principle of subjectivity itself." 152 (PR, 160/1)

7. CONCLUSION

Let's consider again a few features of Hegel's system. First, consider the
metaphysical being Geist. In the history of ideas, this one is not regarded
approvingly. There is no reason for anyone to take this seriously, although it is
unlikely that anyone has. However, I think Hegel's notion of Geist would strike a
cord in many religious people. Oddly, Geist, as a supra-individual spirit,
containing the 'truth' about our 'inner strivings,' and separated from us only by our
'undeveloped' consciousness, resembles the God of our separate theisms.
However, this idea does not 'get us where ultimately Hegel intends,' which is the
proof of God's existence. The surrounding ideas constructed for this purpose,
however, have served political philosophy very well. Hegel's criticism of the
atomism, and the misrepresentation of the 'self in Kantian liberalism, serves well
today as a reminder of the dangers inherent in democratic liberal theory.
152
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Also, before turning to the analysis of the effectiveness of Hegel's critique,
it is wise to consider again the object of Kant's and Hegel's moral thought, the
rational person, willing to consider his judgment in relation to 'right,' or justice.
This is important as it answers the question of why anyone should take the idea of
morality seriously. And, as I understand the thought of these two philosophers.
their answer to this question is that where political conflict (i.e:, war or injustice)
cannot be transcended (done away with entirely) it must be 'managed,' i.e., positive
law developed from morality (in the case of Kant) or 'ethical norms and behaviors
which the community has identified' (in the case of Hegel). Where such laws are
not obeyed, both philosophers support the use of state force (coercion).
Thus, whereas the important similarity between these philosophers is the
'agent' each recognizes, the important difference is the 'content' each grounds for
the idea of moral obligation. For Kant, the rational person is autonomous - selflegislating - and proof of our freedom lies in the fact that we must take ourselves to
be free in order to act morally. For Hegel, this reasoning is abstract, and an ethical
theory based on this premise is empty. For him, the 'ethical whole' (a synthesis of
the universal and the particular) must serve as the content for ethics. And, this
synthesis is the 'actualization' of freedom.
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4
The Adequacy of Hegel's Critique
"Rationality, taken generally and in the abstract, consists in the
thorough-going unity of the universal and the single.
Rationality, concrete in the state, consists (a) so far as its
content is concerned, in the unity of objective freedom (i.e.
freedom of the universal or substantial will) and subjective
freedom (i.e. freedom of everyone in his knowing and in his
volition of particular ends); and consequently, (b) so far as its
form is concerned, in self-determinating action on laws and
principles which are thoughts and so universal. This Idea is the
absolutely eternal and necessary being of mind." HEGEL

It is now time to consider the adequacy of Hegel's arguments, a task which
not surprisingly presents less of a challenge than did ascertaining the core
difference between Kant and Hegel's philosophies - each similar in purpose.
context and method. I have suggested in previous chapters that we locate this core
difference in Hegel's objection to the categorical imperative. Hegel repeatedly
argues that the CJ is a tautology, or an empty formalism. The success of Hegel's
critique is therefore dependent upon I) his successfully illustrating how it is that the
Cl can not provide content to moral obligation, and/or 2) his successfully showing
why it is irrational for others to accept the only content which the CJ can supply to
moral obligation.
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I shall argue in this chapter that although Hegel's political theory presents a
powerful argument for seeing our practical laws as based on societal norms rather
than abstract universalism, Hegel has not provided us with an ethical theory which
adequately grounds this argument. Rather, Kant's ethics of 'autonomy,' the idea
that external principles or normative considerations cannot be brought in or made to
give content to obligations, provides us with an ethical theory which acknowledges
our individual freedom and expresses our concern for all of humanity instead of
concern for that of the state.

1. THE QUESTION OF CONTENT

For Hegel Kant never shows that any particular moral content is valid; he
only shows that certain kinds of action would be wrong if certain content were
presupposed. Kant produces an ethical theory that is empty of content. Or,
similarly, Hegel argues that since the CI-procedure requires a strict separation of
'is' (the particular) from 'ought' (the universal), it necessarily fails to answer the
question of how moral insight can be realized in practice. It then appears that for
Hegel to have approved of Kant's ethics, Kant would have needed to provide a
'directory' of unacceptable (or, acceptable) actions, (i.e., 'do no kill because killing
is evil, and 'evil' is destructive to society'). This then could have been used as a
'guide' for the agent who seeks to act morally. However, as O'Neill explains, the

66

Cl is nowhere proposed as a principle that will by itself generate or entail a
universal moral code. 153
"It is not a moral algorithm (unlike a Principle of
Utility) but (supposedly) a criterion of moral action
for agents who act freely, so may start with various
possible proposals for action. The common
assumption of the three [formulations of the CJ] is
that there is some way by which agents can filter
these initial proposals to check whether they are
morally acceptable. Each formulation of the CI is
offered as an answer to the agent's question "What
ought I to do?", on the assumption that agents will
have certain tentative plans, proposals and policies
which they can consider, revise or reject - or endorse
or pursue." 154

In the contemporary literature we find that the arguments presented by
Critics, theorists such as Sandel, Taylor, and Gadamer, are very similar (if not
identical) to Hegel's. These theorists argue against the "abstract universalism" in
the Kantian system. For example, Gadamer shows that the CJ-procedure has a
clear methodological meaning. And, like Hegel, he views it as a form of' lawtesting reason,' which is decidedly a good thing. 155 However, as Gadamer argues,
"Yet the question still arises: Considering the empirical dependence of human
reason and its ingrained "tendency to evil," how does such a test of the law ever
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Onora O'Neill, "Universal Laws And Ends-In-Themselves," The Monist (Vol. 72, No. 3. July,
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O'Hagan shows that Hegel views this 'law-testing' to be a positive element in formalism, the
'unity of thinking and willing' and praises Kant for this. Timothy O'Hagan. "Kant's Moral and
Political Philosophy." In Stephen Priest. Hegel's Critique of Kant. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)
p. 140.
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come about?" 156 Further, he notes that Kant's moral philosophy already
presupposes a recognition of the moral law. 157 (And the formulas - for example,
those of the law of nature or the end in itself- that are given in the faculty of
judgment, are so unreal that they do not have any persuasive power in
themselves. 158) Gadamer finds that Kant's formula seems to have only a
methodological relevance for reflection insofar as it instructs us to eliminate all
obfuscation stemming from "inclination."
Gadamer, along with Sandel and Taylor argue that the autonomy of moral
reason certainly has the character of intelligible self-determination. However, that
does not exclude the empirical conditionedness of all human actions and decisions.
As Gadamer states,
"The recognition of human conditionedness (in
forbearing judgment) is fully compatible with the
sublime unconditionality of the moral law. It seems
to me characteristic of Kant's reflection that he is not
interested in the distinction between judgments of
conscience about oneself and ethical judgments about
others. For this reason, Kant's response to our
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Hans- Georg Gadamer. "On the Possibility ofa Philosophical Ethics," Ronald Seiner and W.J.
Booth, Kant and Political Philosophy (London: Yale University Press. 1993), p.366.
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Recall, Kant suggests that everyone possesses a good will - which itself recognizes the moral
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Gadamer refers to Kant's example of the person who is considering suicide, of whom Kant says,
"if he is still sufficiently in possession of reason that he can test his decision to commit suicide
according to the model of such a formula, then he will recognize the untenability of his decision."
Gadamer states, "That is obviously a mere construction. The person with thoughts of suicide does
not have that much reason. Even if the moral prohibition against suicide could thereby be

understood, it is still the case that the willingness to reflect, and even more the motivation to test
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Gadamer. "On the Possibility of a Philosophical Ethics," Ronald Beiner and W.J. Booth, Kant and
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question about the moral meaning of moral
philosophy is, in the end, unsatisfactory." 159

It is clear that Hegel (and other Critics) have correctly identified certain
features of Kant's ethics, i.e., its"formalism,' 'universalism' and 'abstraction.'
However, it remains questionable whether or not these qualities actually render
Kant's ethics 'empty.' And, here, we find that resolving this deep criticism (if that
is possible) requires the familiar examination that all questions of political thought
require. The questions of 'who' is the agent and/or "what is his world view?" I
suggest that we find two separate moral world views in play in Kant's and Hegel's
thought.

2. THE KANTIAN AGENT (ON THE POSSIBILITY OF HETERONOMY)

As Reath explains, Kant's insistence on deriving morality from reason is a
rejection of influential empiricist theories that ground moral obligation in empirical
facts about human beings, including both psychological facts and facts about the
needs of human society and the structure of social interaction. 160 Further, the
empiricist may assume some principle of prudential rationality; but he will avoid a

priori principles or normative standards whose motivation cannot be supplied by
desires and behavioral tendencies people are generally observed to have. Kant's
general criticism is that by deriving moral principles from empirically given
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desires, such theories are unable to ground the notion of a practical law. 161 If the
validity of a principle depends on the presence of a desire or interest that one may
lack, then there may be agents without that motive, to whom the principle would
not apply. And, such an agent could only be subject to criticism for lacking the
motive which the principle presupposes. "But that is to depart from the empiricist
viewpoint, by introducing an a priori normative standpoint to which an individual's
desires ought to conform." 162
So, Kant insists on 'abstract universalism' in order to secure the purity of
the rational moral decision, in naive as well as in philosophical consciousness,
against all tarnishing by the viewpoints of inclination and interest. 163 The CJprocedure requires that the moral agent abstract from social and political realities in
choosing maxims which can be universalized. The moral actor must use this 'lawtesting reason' procedure in order to be certain that 1) he is acting from duty alone
(absent inclinations, since these can prejudice his choice), and 2) his actions
correspond with the moral law. 164 Pure practical reason, in the form of the
autonomous will, chooses that maxim which best fits the form and essence of the
moral law. And, the actor follows this chosen imperative not because it is pleasing
160
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to him, but rather because when tested for its universalizability, it proves itself to be
adequate. 165
As Kant states,
"The categorical imperative, which as such only
affirms what obligation is, is: Act upon a maxim that
can also hold as a universal law. You must therefore
first consider your actions in terms of their subjective
"Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy." In Stephen Priest. Hegel's Critique of Kant. (Oxford:
Clarendon University Press, 1987) p. 141.
165
Hoffe shows, "the universality present in every maxim is a subjective (relative) universality and
not objective (absolute or strict) universality, which holds for any rational being whatsoever.
Universalization, the second aspect of the categorical imperative, tests whether or not the subjective
perspective given by a maxim can also be conceived and willed as an objective perspective for a
community of persons. From the broad variety of subjective principles (maxims), the moral ones
are separated from the non-moral ones, and the agent is enjoined to follow the moral maxims.
According to a popular objection, Kant's ethics is indifferent toward the actual welfare of concrete
human beings and is thus inferior to utilitarianism, which (at least) defines morality in terms of
general well-being. At first glance, this objection appears to be justified. Kant's idea of
universalization explicitly excludes the consideration of effects and the assessment of actions in
light of their influence upon well-being. Nonetheless, upon closer examination, the objection
proves to be unjustified. The consideration of effects is excluded from the justification of moral
maxims but not from their application to concrete action. Here they are not just legitimate but
usually indispensable. Not in opposition to but quite in agreement with utilitarianism, Kant
considers the promotion of the well-being of his fellow men. Outfried Hoffe. Immanuel Kant.
Translated by Marshall Farrier. (New York: State of New York Press, 1994) p. 18.
As Priest interprets the charges, Hegel is dissatisfied with Kant's ethical philosophy and
criticizes it "for its illicit externalization and. universalization of contingent features of given
societies." Hegel finds that such (empiricist) theories 'abstract' singular aspects, i.e. the drive for
self-preservation, give them the 'form' of unified concepts, and elevate them to the rank of
fundamental principles. Also, he finds that the empiricists lack the necessary vision of reason,
developing historically and finding social embodiment, and so fail to give a satisfactory picture of
society as a structured relational system founded upon rational principle. Priest quotes Hegel in
arguing that "The confusion of essential and contingent, of a priori and a posteriori, is itself a
function of the absence of the requisite concepts ofreason, development and actualization." And,
Priests points out that the great advance of the formal over the empiricist variant of natural law
doctrine is that it elaborate a normative rather than merely descriptive conception of selfconsciousness, in which the essence ofright and duty and the essence of the thinking and willing
subject are one and the same. "Of course, this union of thinking and willing is theorized by Kant in
the conception of the CI, according to which a rational being endorses a universal principle of
consistency to govern his practical as much as his theoretical life. But this, Hegel suggests, is both
the summit and the limit of formalism: the summit in that it develops to its fullest extent the concept
of the autonomous, self-conscious will; the limit, in that it is infected by the vices of abstraction
(emptiness) and dualism." Stephen Priest. Hegel's Critique of Kant. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1987) p. 135-6.
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principles; but you can know whether this principle
also holds objectively only in this way: That when
your reason subjects it to the test of conceiving
yourself as also giving universal law through it, it
qualifies for such a giving of universal law." 166
Certainly, Kant recognizes that the moral law recommends 'ideal' behavior.
And, he acknowledges that as imperfect beings, it is unlikely that we will always
succeed in acting 'perfectly.' However, he sees nothing wrong with keeping this
ideal constantly in view. And, as shown in chapter two, he further finds that it
benefits society to do so.

3. THE HEGELIAN AGENT vs THE NORMATIVITY OF MORALITY

The agent of Hegel's world view is one who requires that practical laws be
based on societial norms rather than abstract universalism and who views
abstraction as empty. Such criticism, however, seems especially specious upon
review of the infamous examples Kant offers in applying the formulas to situations
of everyday life. Korsgaard explains why the Hegelian argument is inadequate.
Korsgarrd states that for Kant an 'external' principle or normative
consideration cannot be brought in (or made) to give content to obligations. 1<'7 The
analysis here is complex. Yet, I understand her to mean that the principle of the
moral law (where "do that which is perfect" is the form) IS by itself - empty. Yet,
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it is because Kant identifies the 'self as autonomous (where nothing except my
own will can make a law normative for me) that his ethics has content. It is the
actual willing - or the choosing of the CJ as an objective end for oneself, that
renders the principle intrinsically normative, rather than extrinsically normative. 168
Korsgaard explains that content brought in from external normative sources
violates Kant's analysis of 'autonomy.' She states that a law in the nature of things,
if it is understood as a theoretical or metaphysical principle that is external to the
will, gives rise to exactly the same problem that divine law does. Laws in the
nature of things can only make our maxims extrinsically, not intrinsically,
normative. But the Kantian laws of autonomy are positive laws: moral laws exist
because we legislate them. 169 Further, Korsgaard points out that this, as the
Rationalists (of the eighteenth century) had argued all along, is what an obligation
must be. Autonomy is the only possible source of intrinsic normativity, and so of
obligation. 170
168

Note: Kant holds that while the objective reality of autonomy cannot be demonstrated, it must
nevertheless be presupposed as the "conditio sine qua non" of conceiving oneself as responsible,
good, or just; that a being that could not conceive itself as an autonomous moral cause could never
imagine itself responsible or good or just. For Kant then autonomy is a necessary point of view. or
a necessary hypothesis, in explaining the possibility of the common moral concepts that we actually
use; but autonomy is not itself a substantive moral duty. It is rather the hypothetical condition of
being able to conceive any duties. Patrick Riley. Will and Political Legitimacy. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982) p. 184.
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judgments express 'internal' or 'external' reasons. According to intemalists, if someone knows or
accepts a moral judgment then she must have a motive for acting on it. The motive is part of the
content of the judgment: the reason why the action is right is a reason for doing it. According to
extemalists, this is not necessarily so: there could be a case in which I understand both that and why
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Today we find that this same background reasoning continues to provide the
normative content to contemporary democratic liberal theory in America. and
Communitarians object to this. 171

Yet, I find that Taylor (a Critic) makes the most

penetrating argument in favor of Kantian content. He states if one views Hegel's
objections as suggesting that "ethical theory has to comprehend given practice: it
cannot just abstract from it" then, we find that Kant's ethical thoughtremains sound
- to those who agree with, or desire such an abstracted, formal system of Right, or

it is right for me to do something, and yet have no motive for doing it. Since most of us believe that
an action's being right is a reason for doing it, internalism seems more plausible. It captures one
element of our sense that moral judgments have normative force: they are motivating. But some
philosophers believe that internalism, if correct, would also impose a restriction on moral reasons.
If moral reasons are to motivate, they must spring from an agent's personal desires and
commitments. This is unappealing, for unless the desires and commitments that motivate moral
conduct are universal and inescapable, it cannot be required for everyone. And this leaves out the
other element in our sense that moral judgments have normative force: they are binding. Some
intemalists, however, have argued that the force of internalism cuts the other way. If moral reasons
must motivate, and I show you than an action is morally right, I have ipso facto provided you with a
motive for doing it. Moral reasons motivate because they are perceived as binding. A good person,
according to these intemalists, does the right thing because it is the right thing, or acts from the
motive of duty."
Korsgaard also shows that the term "obligation" is a source of confusion, because "an
obligation" is sometimes used loosely as synonym for "a duty," a required action. But "obligation"
refers not so much to the action as to the requiredness of the action, to its normative pull. Ibid., p.
33 I.
171

As Kymlicka shows, Communitarians or Hegelians, are more concerned with the particular
practices of actual communities than with 'justice' itself. And, the liberal finds that given the
multiplicity of religious and moral values in modern societies, where a variety of conceptions of the
good compete for allegiance, a 'just' society is one which is governed by democratically adopted
principles ofright, in the form of positive law (or, a deontological political theory such as
liberalism). And, the clear goal for the liberal is stability - a tolerant political structure where
competing conceptions of the good can compete in peace - as far as is practically possible.
Essentially, the Kantian rejects the Communitarian ideal of 'a common good,' and therefore

advocates a 'system of justice' which allows for the fair competition of competing visions of the
good. A society governed by principles of the good (such as Hegel's) would inevitably lead to
heternomy. Will Kymlicka. Contemporary Political Philosophy. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)
p. 262.
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even justice. 172 "However, contemporarily, we find an increased desire for a system
of Right, or justice which concerns itself increasingly, with the particulars of the
society." 173
Taylor is exactly right, on both points. First, Taylor is correct in pointing
out that Hegel's charges are proclaimed unsound by those who share Kant's moral
world view. By those who view society as a collection of sufficiently
"unembedded" individuals such that society 'naturally' embodies a plurality of
competing visions of the good. By those for whom a 'theory of the good' (based on
'a commonly shared vision of the good' - the Hegelian and Communtarian
prescription) is equal to 'a theory of totalitarianism.' And, for those who desire a
theory of justice based on democratically adopted laws in order to ensure the
stability of our social and political institutions. Second, Taylor is correct in
showing that contemporarily we find an increased desire for a theory of justice
which concerns itself more with the particulars of the society. Liberal theory today
is deeply concerned with concepts such as 'equality of life chances,' 'distributive
justice,' 'the autonomy of the family' and 'the principle of merit.' And, as Fiskin
notes, each of these has produced a vast literature. 174 However, it is quite safe to
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the distribution of goods in society. He states, "The family is the crucial source of inequality in
modern society that has gone largely unexamined in the theory of distributive justice. Inequalities
between the races, between the sexes, between states, between generations, inequalities that result
from market forces, from genetic differences, from the political process - all of these inequalities
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suggest that we are not willing to risk the replacement of autonomy as our guiding
principle with a theory of the good.

4. CONCLUSION

Hegel has reentered the dialogue of political philosophy with intense
urgency. In fact, the title of this thesis, 'The Reemergence of Kantian Ethics .. ·
seems somewhat of an insult to Hegel's revival. I have attempted in several places
to show that contemporary theorists supporting a more Hegelian prescription
provide arguments resembling his own against Kantian ethics. However, I have not
yet stated that I credit Hegel and such Critics with what I view to be a profound
move toward more 'culturally sensitive' political thought. I want to argue here that
contemporarily we find the dialogue between liberals and their counterparts (Critics
- including feminists, socialists and communitarians) coming closer together.
Although the liberals' thought is still deontological (it prioritizes what is a matter of
justice to which all persons have a claim, over the 'good' or what is a matter of
one's individual pursuit of a particular conception of the good life within the limits
of justice) 175 we find both liberals and non-liberals confronting the issues of
'dominance' 'equal opportunity' and 'fairness.' This, however, has always been
the case for the Critics. Liberals, on the other hand were often more concerned

have become familiar issues in recent moral and political theory. James S. Fiskin. Justice, Equal
, Opportunity, And The Family (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) p. 1-3.
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with defending a particular theory of justice than with battling such issues. As
Waltzer points out in arguing for the reduction of dominance, " ..this line of
argument, though it is not uncommon historically, has never fully emerged in
philosophical writing. Philosophers have tended to criticize (or to justify) existing
or emerging monopolies of wealth, power, and education. Or, they have criticized
(or justified) particular conversions-of wealth into education or of office into
wealth. And all this, most often, in the name of some radically simplified
distributive system. The critique of dominance will suggest instead a way of
reshaping and then living with the actual complexity of distributions." 176 And, as
Fiskin shows, equal opportunity and the fair distribution of goods is now the central
concern of modem liberalism. 177
This chapter attempted to bring together some of the conclusions reached in
the previous chapters to show that whereas Hegel attacks the subjectivistic,
atomistic, and moralistic foundations of Kant's ethical thought, his efforts do little
more than serve as a warning of the dangers inherent in democratic liberal theory.
Therefore, Hegel's objections to abstract universalism need not be resolved
contemporarily. As Riley notes, Kant's practical philosophy offers a coherent and
consistent conception of volition in which free will is a "necessary hypothesis," a
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"moral cause" that makes duty, responsibility, and the like intelligible. 178 This
hypothetical free will serves as the foundation of a moral order that is meant to be
paralleled one day in an external social system (universal republicanism) in which
man will be as socially autonomous as he was always morally autonomous.
Further, Hegel's fear of subjectivism led him to make a distinction between private
morality and social ethics. 179 However, the desire for concreteness, for
transcendence of the never ending Kantian ought-to-be, appears to lead Hegel to
acceptance of whatever level of ethics has been reached at a given point in
history. 180 Thus, we find that although a perfect political philosophy has not
resulted from Kant's ethical theory, it presents the best option. 181 Riley suggests of
Kant, " ..the answers are not all correct, but the scope of the inquiry is."
Hegel's alternative ethics, Sittlichkeit, is in the end, insufficient. However,
his philosophy proves to be enormously beneficial as it calls attention to the all
important 'realities' of society. Hegel's critique of Kant also proves quite
concretely, that the problem of defining "'Right," a task for all generations, IS the
quintessential problem of political philosophy, and, as we find here, the source of
its' greatest historical battles.
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